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On October 26, 1989, a Rhode Island Superior Court judge or-
dered Stephen J. Germershausen to place the following four-by-six-
inch ad with his picture in the Providence Journal-Bulletin: " 'I am 
Stephen Germershausen. I am 29 years old. . . . I was convicted of 
child molestation .... If you are a child molester, get professional help 
immediately, or you may find your picture and name in the paper, and 
your life under control of the state.' " 1 Purchasing this ad was a con-
dition of his probation.2 
In another era, Germershausen might have been put on a wheel 
and had all of the bones in his body cracked, one at a time.3 During 
the late 1600s, he might have been nailed by both ears to a pillory, 
then whipped twenty times,4 or branded with an ''M" for molester.5 
He might have been banished or exiled from the United States.6 Or, 
he might have been placed in public stocks7 and forced to apologize 
1. Hulick, Molester's Sentence: Photo Ad in Paper, Ariz. Republic, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 
1 (state ed.). 
2. Id. 
3. See, e.g., L. BERKSON, THE CoNCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1975) 
(describing various punitive practices of England and colonial America). 
4. See R. SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 30 (1938) (describing 
punishment given to a witness who was found guilty of perjury). 
5. See id. at 35 (reporting that in 1663, Maryland laws provided that county justices should 
be given irons for burning "malefactors" - perhaps "H" for "hog stealer,'' "R" for "runaway 
slave,'' ''M" for "murderer,'' or "T" for "thief"). 
6. See id. at 38 (noting that banishment from the province was a penalty in Maryland during 
the late 1600s). 
7. Id. at 39 (noting that to set a man in stocks was a usual form of punishment in Maryland 
during the late 1600s). 
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and make financial restitution to the families of his three victims. 8 
Electing an alternative not unlike some of these penalties, the Rhode 
Island judge imposed on Germershausen a thirty-five-year suspended 
sentence, with thirty-five years' probation, and compelled him to pub-
licize his conviction with this newspaper ad.9 
Germershausen's publicity sentence is part of a modest trend in 
criminal law. In a smattering of recent cases, several judges have re-
quired defendants to apologize publicly to their victims10 or to wear 
signs listing their offenses.11 An Oregon judge makes some offenders 
buy newspaper ads to apologize for their misdeeds. 12 And the State of 
Nevada now allows convicted drunk drivers to elect between impris-
onment or performing community service while dressed in clothing 
that identifies them as drunk drivers. t3 
These throwbacks to colonial-type penalties spring from frustra-
tion with the conventional options of prison and parole. 14 Prison over-
crowding, as well as recurring doubts about the appropriateness and 
the effectiveness of incarceration, make imprisonment seem infeasible, 
unduly harsh, or otherwise unacceptable in some cases. Yet, many 
judges believe that to parole the convicted individual is too lenient.15 
In an attempt to fill this gap, reformers have proposed a host of alter-
native, creative sentencing strategies, which have begun to reshape 
8. In fact, the judge also ordered him to contribute $1000 to a program financed by a rape 
crisis center for child victims of sexual assault. See Hulick, supra note 1. The remedy of forcing 
a defendant to make financinl restitution to the victim of a crime has a long history in the United 
States. Semmes describes an early Maryland case in which a convicted forger was ordered " 'set 
on the pillory and loose one of her ears,' " after which she was to be "imprisoned for twelve 
months and to pay double costs and damages" to the victim of the forgery. R. SEMMES, supra 
note 4, at 32. Money fines, of course, have a far longer history than the American experience, as 
the ancient concept of the "wergeld" proves. See P. SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OP SUPPER• 
ING 3 (1984). 
9. See Hulick, supra note 1. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 50-55. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 41-49. 
12. With Jails Overcrowded, Judges Look for Innovative Sentences to Fit Crimes, Chicago 
Daily L. Bull., Feb. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 5. In another recent example, a New Hampshire judge 
ordered a man convicted of raping a 10-year-old boy "to buy ads in two locnl newspapers apolo-
gizing for his crime." Flogging?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22, 1991, at 6. 
13. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (referring to Nev. Rev. Stat. 
484.3792 (l)(a)(2)) (1987). 
14. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
15. Money fines likewise do not fill the judges' sanctions gap for several reasons. First, many 
defendants cannot pay the fines. Second, those who can afford them may pass the cost on to their 
"customers." See, e.g., Fisse, Sanctions Against Corporations: The Limitations of Fines and the 
Enterprise of Creating Alternatives, in CORRIGIBLE CoRPORATIONS AND UNRULY LAW 137, 140 
(B. Fisse & P. French eds. 1985). Moreover, even when fines might be an effective deterrent, 
popular opinion may demand that the defendant pay for her misdeeds with more than cash. See 
French, Publicity and the Control of Corporate Conduct: Hester Prynne's New Image, in CORRI· 
GIBLE CoRPORATIONS AND UN~ULY LAW, supra, at 159-60. 
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criminal justice in the United States.16 
The resort to formal shaming as a criminal sanction is only one of 
several attempts to expand the sentencer's arsenal in an effective, inex-
pensive manner. Formal shaming, however, is perhaps the most sen-
sational of these new penalties. It also exploits, in a particularly 
dramatic and explicit fashion, the assumed link between people's sense 
of shame and their tendency to observe legal norms. The purpose of 
this Article is to analyze whether this link is one that American crimi-
nal court judges can, or should, exploit. 
I begin with a description of the new shaming sanctions and the 
possible justifications for this type of penalty.17 I then identify both 
psychological and anthropological aspects of the phenomenon of 
shame, or "losing face." 18 I describe several cultures in which sham-
ing practices are, or were, significant means of sanctioning behavior, 
and outline the shared features of these cultures.19 
These psychological and anthropological materials, taken together, 
suggest that shaming practices are most effective and meaningful when 
five conditions are satisfied. First, the potential offenders must be 
members of an identifiable group, such as a close-knit religious or eth-
nic community. Second, the legal sanctions must actually compromise 
potential offenders' group social standing. 20 That is, the affected 
group must concur with the legal decisionmaker's estimation of what 
is, or should be, humiliating to group members. Third, the shaming 
must be communicated to the group and the group must withdraw 
from the offender - shun her - physically, emotionally, financially, 
or otherwise.21 Fourth, the shamed person must fear withdrawal by 
the group.22 Finally, the shamed person must be afforded some means 
of regaining community esteem, unless the misdeed is so grave that the 
offender must be permanently exiled or demoted. 23 
I apply these five characteristics to modem American communi-
ties, and speculate about whether formal shaming by contemporary 
American criminal courts within their communities makes practical 
sense.24 I argue that the dominant social and cultural traditions in the 
16. Malcolm, New Strategies to Fight Crime Go Far Beyond Stiffer Terms and More Cells, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1990, at A16, col. 1. 
17. See infra notes 41-92 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 110-96 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 197-257 and accompanying text. 
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United States do not reflect the level of interdependence, strong norm 
cohesion, and robust communitarianism that tends to characterize cul-
tures in which shaming is prevalent and effective. Moreover, federal 
and state law enforcement includes no public ritual or ceremony for 
reintegrating or "forgiving" a shamed offender. Given these circum-
stances, I conclude that public shaming by a criminal court judge will 
be, at most, a retributive spectacle that is devoid of other positive com-
munity-expressive or community-reinforcing content. Additionally, I 
hypothesize that these judicial shamings will not significantly deter 
crime in most urban, and likely many nonurban American settings. 25 
Finally, I consider whether shaming is a reasonably humane 
method of punishing criminals, regardless of its practical effectiveness. 
In particular, I address the limiting concerns of proportionality,26 
equality,21 and cruelty.28 I maintain that these three concerns, which 
are raised by all forms of punishment, are particularly strong with 
shaming punishments and point against use of these penalties.29 These 
conclusions are relevant to all publicly imposed criminal sanctions to 
the extent that all methods of public punishment attempt to exploit 
the target community's shared sense of revulsion and shame. 
II. THE REVIVAL 
A. Introduction 
The revival of shaming springs from profound and widespread dis-
satisfaction with existing methods of punishment. In particular, many 
people, including judges, doubt the effectiveness and humanity of 
prison. 30 Yet, the main alternative to prison - parole - is equally 
unattractive, both because the community fears the often unmonitored 
25. See infra notes 209-35 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 268-71 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra note 272 and accompanying text. 
29. Id. 
30. American prisons are terribly overcrowded and expensive to run. See, e.g., Finn, Judicial 
Responses to Prison Crowding, 67 JUDICATURE 318, 319 (1984) (noting that state prison popula-
tions increased 54% between 1973 and 1982); Prison Overcrowding Project Update, Crim. J. 
Newsletter, Mar. 28, 1983, at 6; Silas, Homebodies. A.B.A. J., May 1, 1986, at 28, 29 (reporting 
that Oklahoma's prison population doubled between 1979 and 1984, prompting the state legisla-
ture to expand home detention as an alternative to incarceration); With Jails CA·ercrowded, 
Judges Look for Innovative Sentences to Fit Crimes. Chicago Daily L. Bull., Feb. 24, 1988, at 1, 
col. 4 (quoting a district court judge who says he imposes novel sentences because the prisons and 
detention centers are overcrowded); see generally Farrington & Nuttall, Prison Size, Overcrowd-
ing, Prison Violence, and Recidivism, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 221 (1980); Holbert & Call, The Perspec-
tive of State Correctional Officials on Prison Overcrowding: Causes, Court Orders, and Solutions, 
FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1989, at 25; The Prison Overcrowding Crisis, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 1 (1983-1984); Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analy-
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return of the offender to its neighborhoods, and because most people 
believe criminals should not go unpunished.31 
This dissatisfaction with the primary punishment options has led 
to experimental, creative sanctions and probation conditions, which 
include the "shaming and shunning" practices. The full range of these 
experimental alternatives includes furlough programs, 32 community 
service sentences, 33 home surveillance systems, 34 so-called "shock pro-
sis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the 
Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1977). 
Prisons also can be dangerous and deplorable places, as evidenced by the prisoners' rights 
decisions of the 1960s-1980s. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520 (1979), Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 
(1974); Tousaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986); Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33 
(2d Cir. 1986); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 
(1971); Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Ark. 1978). Finn reports that "[b]y 
1976, over 19,000 petitions for relief had been filed in federal courts, representing over 15 percent 
of the entire civil filings ..•. By the end of 1982, 31 states were under court order to remedy 
crowded conditions alone, and another nine were facing similar court challenges." Finn, supra, 
at 264. 
31. Objections to lenient sentences and to uneven enforcement of the criminal penalties led to 
the adoption of mandatory sentencing guidelines in the federal system. See U.S. SENTENCING 
CoMMN., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL (1988). The guidelines were upheld as 
constitutional in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Nevertheless, the guidelines 
continue to be extremely controversial. See, e.g., Bishop, Mandatory Sentences in Drug Cases: Is 
the Law Defeating Its Purpose?, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990, at B16, col. 3. The nature and tenor 
of these debates reveal how divided and confused attitudes about proper punishment ends remain 
in the United States, even among the "experts." 
32. See, e.g., R. STEGGERDA & P. VENEZIA, CoMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO 
TRAomoNAL CoRRECTioNs 9-12 (1974) (research conducted by the Research Center of the 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency describing community-based alternatives to incar-
ceration, including work-release, residential facilities, fines, and probation with support services); 
Unger, Private Pomona Company Has an Alternative to Jail, L.A. Daily J., May 19, 1986, § II, at 
1, col. 3 (describing California's experimentation with privately run work furlough programs, in 
lieu of incarceration). 
33. See, e.g., Doctor Sentenced to Heal in India, Natl. L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 3, col. 1 (psychi-
atrist convicted of Medicare fraud ordered to give medical services in India); With Jails Over-
crowded, Judges Look for Innovative Sentences to Fit Crimes, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Feb. 24, 
1988, at 1, col. 4 (describing Chicago judge's sentencing of a defendant who harassed blacks to 
200 hours of community service with the NAACP); Wise, Was the Judge's ''Sentence" Off Base?, 
Natl. L.J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 43, col. 1 (baseball player Al Bumbry sentenced to 20 minutes of 
signing autographs for speeding); Sentenced to Happy Hours, Natl. L.J., Apr. 12, 1982, at 39, col. 
3 (cocktail lounge owner ordered to provide liquor to geriatric ward oflocal hospital after lounge 
was cited for overcrowding; pizza parlor owner ordered to provide pizzas to hospital patients; 
and music student convicted of drunk driving ordered to play concerts for patients). For a criti-
cal reaction to community service penalties, both as an insufficiently harsh penalty and as a 
perversion of the concept of public service as activity inspired by public spiritedness, not a court 
order, see Gordon, Community Service, Mark of Disgrace, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at A17, 
col. 3. 
34. "Home detention" is the pretrial or post-conviction, full- or part-time restriction of a 
defendant to her own home. See, e.g., Silas, supra note 30, at 28 (describing sentences of home 
confinement, used by a majority of the states as alternatives to prison); Gombossy, Florist Placed 
Under 'House A"est' in Credit Cord Scam, Natl. L.J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 6, col. 1 (discussing 
house arrest as response to prison overcrowding in a Connecticut case, and in other jurisdic-
tions); A Prisoner in His Own Home, Natl. L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 35, col. 3 (describing sentence 
confining burglar to his mother's property for two years); Berg, Home Detention Gaining Sup-
port, Crim. Justice Newsletter, Nov. 21, 1983, at 3, col. l; Berg, Electronic Leashes Popular -
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bation,"35 forced charitable contributions,36 chemical therapy,37 
forced birth control, 38 and even one recent case of court-ordered cas-
tration. 39 Shaming penalties thus are one strand of a larger movement 
to expand the sentencer's arsenal of penalties. 
Unlike these other punishment innovations, however, the shaming 
sanctions are explicitly designed to make a public spectacle of the of-
fender's conviction and punishment, and to trigger a negative, down-
ward change in the offender's self-concept.40 Embarrassment and 
consequent social isolation may result from any punishment; but with 
most other sanctions shame and shunning are incidental and, some 
would argue, undesirable consequences of the penalty. With shaming 
penalties, in contrast, embarrassment is the principal purpose of the 
punishment. In the following sections I describe several modern in-
stances of formal attempts to shame offenders. 
B. Signs 
The most obvious illustrations of shaming are the sign sanctions. 
Well-publicized41 examples of sign punishments are the convicted 
But Effective?, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 14, 1987, at 5, col. 1; Federal Judge, Citing Costs of Prison, 
Imposes ''House Arrest," Crim. Justice Newsletter, Oct. 1, 1985, at 2, col. 2; see generally Rush, 
Deinstitutional Incapacitation: Home Detention in Pre-Trial and Post-Conviction Contexts, 13 N. 
KY. L. REv. 375, 378 (1987). Home detention can be monitored by intensive human supervision 
or by electronic surveillance through electronic monitors secured to the defendant's ankle or 
wrist. Id. at 378. 
35. Shock probation is the short-term incarceration of a first offender, intended to "scare her 
straight" by showing her the harsh reality of penitentiary life. See generally Note, Shock Proba-
tion: An Alternative to Traditional Forms of Sentencing, 12 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 697 (1981). 
36. See, e.g., Liss, A Fine Way to Give to Charity, Natl. L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 47, col. I. See 
generally Note, Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Federal Probation for Corporate De-
fendants: A Controversial Sanction Under New Law, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 530 (1985). 
37. See, e.g., Demsky, The Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, 5 J, 
LEGAL MED. 295 (1984) (discussing the compelled use of chemical hormone regulation with 
convicted sex offenders). 
38. See A Misconceived Ruling. L.A. Daily J., June 7, 1988, at 4, col. 1 (editorial). 
39. See Goldfarb, Practice of Using Castration as Sentence Being Questioned, Crim. Justice 
Newsletter, Feb. 15, 1984, at 3, col. 2 (reporting choice between castration or a 30-year sentence 
that a South Carolina judge gave to three rapists). But see Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. Supp. 687 
(D. Nev. 1918) (declaring unconstitutional a Nevada statute that authorized vasectomies for 
certain sex offenders); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), revd. on other grounds, 242 
U.S. 468 (1917) (invalidating similar legislation in Iowa). 
40. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
41. See Nordheimer, In-House Dispute: Drunken Driver Bumper Sticker, N.Y. Times, June 
6, 1985, at A22, col. 3; Scarlet Bumper: Humiliating Drunk Drivers, TIME, June 17, 1985, at 52. 
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drunk driver bumper sticker42 and distinctive license plate. 43 The con-
victed driver may continue to exercise driving privileges only if she 
affixes the identifying sign to her vehicle. 
Judge Titus, the Sarasota County Florida judge who initiated the 
bumper sticker penalty in 1985, claims that after the program began, 
drunk driving incidents dropped one third in the county. 44 In explain-
ing why she imposed the glow-in-the-dark sticker penalty, Judge Titus 
said that tougher fines had failed to curb drunk driving. She noted 
that "many people who are convicted of DUI as first offenders are well 
adjusted in society. They hold good jobs and value their social stand-
ing .... The DUI sticker capitalized on [their] fear of public notice," 
by bringing "shame, disgrace and a ruined reputation."45 
The state of Nevada recently adopted a statute that allows the 
judge to order a defendant to perform forty-eight hours of work for 
the community while dressed in clothing that identifies her as a DUI 
offender.46 In a decision involving a defendant convicted under this 
statute, the U.S. Supreme Court speculated that this penalty was "less 
embarrassing and less onerous than six months in jail."47 
Identifying signs have also been part of sentences imposed on sex 
42. See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam), 
appeal denied, 496 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1986). See generally Note, The Bumper Sticker: The Innova-
tion That Failed, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1988) (discussing the legality and impact of the 
bumper sticker penalty); Ohle & Wise, Stick Goes the Bumper, Natl. L.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 35, 
col. 2 (describing bumper sticker sanctions imposed by Washington state court judge). 
43. See OHIO REV. CooE ANN. § 4503.231 (Page's 1988). The Ohio statute, which took 
effect in 1986, reads as follows: 
No motor vehicle registered in the name of a person whose certificate of registration and 
identification license plates have been impounded •.. shall be operated or driven on any 
highway in this state unless it displays identification license plates which are a different color 
from those regularly issued and carry a special serial number that may be readily identified 
by law enforcement officers. 
The statute was applied in State v. Barbone, No. 3653, slip. op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1987) 
(requiring convicted drunk driver to display the different color plates pursuant to§ 4503.231). 
44. Titus, ''Scarlet Letter" a Just Punishment (Council of State Governments publication) 
(on file with author). Judge Titus reports that Sarasota County's DUI arrest rate dropped 33% 
during January-June 1986 over the same period in 1985. She says nothing indicated that the 
decline was due to decreased police patrols. Id. 
45. Id. Judge Titus added that the sentence might also force alcoholics to acknowledge their 
illness, and that the glow-in-the-dark sticker might aid law enforcement officers in apprehending 
drivers who violated their driving restrictions. Id. 
46. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.3792 (l)(a)(2) (1987). 
47. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 544 (1989). Justice Marshan wrote the 
opinion. The issue before the Court was whether the defendant had a sixth amendment right to 
trial by jury under the Nevada statute. The right does not attach for "petty offenses," which 
usually means offenses for which the maximum imprisonment is six months or less. In observing 
that the distinctive attire was less offensive than a six-month jail sentence, though, the Court 
noted that the record failed to describe the clothing or where and when it had to be worn. 
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544 n.10. 
The case raises an interesting question for "innovative sentencing" reforms: when is the al-
ternative sanction penalty grave enough to trigger the jury trial right? 
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offenders. In one case, a repeat offender was required, as a condition 
of probation, to post signs with letters at least three inches high on his 
residence and vehicle doors that read: DANGEROUS SEX OF-
FENDER - NO CHILDREN ALLOWED.48 Other courts have re-
quired sex offenders to place ads in the local newspaper publicizing 
their offenses, as in the Rhode Island case described above. 49 
C. Apologies 
A second type of shame sanction is the public apology or "confes-
sion." Judge Elaine Crane of Willoughby Municipal Court in Ohio 
orders some first-time offenders to write a "confessional" letter to the 
local newspaper. 50 In Tennessee, a judge ordered a defendant con-
victed of aiding in the sale of a stolen vehicle to confess his crime 
before a church congregation.51 In Newport, Oregon, a town of 8500 
people, a convicted criminal may be ordered to write and pay for a 
newspaper ad in which she announces the subject of her conviction 
and apologizes to the community.52 One man who opted for the pub-
lic apology in lieu of a prison sentence stated that the cost of the social 
embarrassment paled when compared to the cost of six months in 
prison.53 
Another sanction closely related to the apology is compelled inter-
48. State v. Bateman, 95 Or. App. 456, 771 P.2d 314 (en bane), cert denied, 308 Or. 197, 777 
P.2d 410 (1989); see also "Scarlet Letter" Sentence OK'd by Ore. Court, Natl. L.J., Nov. 23, 1987, 
at 9, col. 4. 
49. Hulick, supra note 1. The judge, Corinne P. Grande, reportedly imposed the sentence as 
a condition of the offender's probation because "these cases aren't publicized" and "[t]here 
doesn't appear to be sufficient social response to people like [the defendant]." Id. at Al4. She 
added, "It seemed to me that [the defendant) ought to be made a public example." Id.; see also 
Better than Prison, Peninsula Times Tribune, Jan. 4, 1990, at A9, col. 2 (picture of defendant 
who agreed to wear for one year a T-shirt that read "My Record and Two Six Packs Equal Four 
Years" on the front, and "I'm on Felony Probation" on the back instead of returning to prison); 
Mintz, Judge Turns Confessing into a Religious Experience, Natl. L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 47, col. 2 
(describing sanction requiring car thief to post five-by-four-foot sign in his yard announcing that 
he was a thief). 
50. See Enforcing the "Law" of the Letter, Natl. L.J., May 3, 1982, at 55, at col. 2. The judge 
stated that the purpose of the sentence is to ask the defendant what she has learned and to 
apologize to her victim. Id. 
51. See Mintz, supra note 49, at 47; cf. Woman Ordered to Apologize to Man Falsely Accused 
of Rape, Gainsville Sun, July 3, 1990, at 4A, col. 3 (describing an order of a Nebraska judge that 
a woman who falsely accused a man of rape run radio and newspaper advertisements apologizing 
to him). 
52. See Mathews, Freedom Means Having to Say You're Sorry, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1986, at 
A3, col. 1. In this report, the district attorney and probation officer who initiated the program 
explain that the idea " 'grew out of pure, sheer frustration.' " Id. They add that in a small town, 
the publication would at least warn other citizens of the dangerousness of some offenders. A 
local judge is reported to have said that he saw no problem with apology ads, as long as they were 
part of a plea bargain and not an imposed sentence. Id. 
53. Id. Some more recent media accounts have criticized the shaming punishment, however. 
For example, a recent Newsweek article characterized apology advertisements as "a scarlet letter 
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action between the defendant and her victims. For example, a defen-
dant convicted of drunk driving may have to meet with people whose 
lives have been adversely affected by drunk drivers. s4 The sentencer 
who orders these face-to-face encounters may be motivated more by 
the desire to promote consciousness-raising in the defendant or retrib-
utive satisfaction for the victims, however, than by the desire to shame 
the offender. Still, the opportunity for victims to confront the defen-
dant and to describe how her deed has injured them may well trigger 
shame or guilt in the defendant, as well as satisfy the victims' expres-
sive needs in some instances. ss 
for the 1990s" and noted opponents' comparison of the practice to "public flogging." See Flog-
ging?, supra note 12. 
54. See, e.g., Egan, Pain Relived in War on Drunk Driving. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1989, at 
Al6, col. 2 (describing a Redmond, Washington, program under which anyone convicted of 
drunk driving must spend an hour with a victim's panel composed of people whose lives have 
been changed adversely by drunk drivers). Forced interaction is also used as a sanction for 
racially insensitive or abusive conduct on some college campuses. For example, the University of 
Michigan adopted a controversial Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment by 
Students in the University Environment, under which some students had been sentenced to write 
apologies to the campus newspaper and to attend counseling or small group discussions. See 
Hentoff, Watching What You Say on Campus, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1989, at A23, col. 3. The 
policy was struck down as unconstitutional. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 
(E.D. Mich. 1989). 
A different approach to victim satisfaction in a drunk driving case was fashioned by the 
parties in a civil case in Virginia. The parents of a teenage girl killed by a drunk driver agreed to 
settle the lawsuit for $936, but demanded that the teen defendant pay the amount $1 per week. 
The parents insisted on the $1 weekly payments in order to remind the defendant weekly of what 
he had done to their daughter. See Campbell, Parent Won't Let DUI Driver Forget, Gainesville 
Sun, Mar. 31, 1990, at 2A, col. 5. 
55. An apology is a sophisticated social gesture, as Goffman has observed. See E. GOFFMAN, 
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 113 (1971). He has described the apology as a device "through which an 
individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that 
dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule." Id. According to 
Goffman, an apology is a form of "ritual work," that may not compensate for the loss, but that 
expresses a pious attitude toward the rule. Thus it is "a matter of indicating a relationship, not 
compensating a loss." Id. at 118. 
As Goffman has put it: 
In its fullest form, the apology has several elements: expression of embarrassment and cha-
grin; clarification that one knows what conduct has been expected and sympathizes with the 
application of negative sanction; verbal rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of the wrong 
way of behaving along with vilification of the self that so behaved; espousal of the right way 
and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course; performance of penance and the volunteer-
ing of restitution. 
Id. at 113. Given this characteristic, apologies have a "one-time" effectiveness: if the offender 
repeats the crime, then his apology is revealed to be insincere, and he has proven himself to be 
more the self that committed the misdeed than the self that was originally embarrassed. Id. at 
165-66. The "relationship" indicated by the apology thus is shown to be false. 
The apology sanction seems to rest on the mistaken assumption that all victims will react 
favorably to the offender's contribution. Different victims, though, will experience a crime differ-
ently. Not all victims want or need offender remorse, explanations, or confessions. See generally 
Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 964-66 (1985) (discussing the 
ways in which one-dimensional assumptions about victims' experiences can distort discussions of 
criminal procedures designed to protect "victims' rights"). 
A victim's satisfaction in an apology often may be meager or none, depending on the crime 
and on the victim. For example, a robbery victim may be far more satisfied if she reclaims the 
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These modem penalties bear a strong resemblance to the pillory, 
and other humiliatory sanctions of the American colonial period. The 
obvious question is whether these sanctions make as much sense to-
day, given our alternatives, as they arguably made in the seventeenth 
century. In other words, does shaming deter crime, rehabilitate of-
fenders, or serve any other legitimate punishment objective, given con-
temporary cultural conditions? If it is not likely to effect these ends, 
then should the new sanctions be condemned as misguided spasms of 
judicial and legislative pique? 
III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
[T]heories of punishment are not theories in any normal sense. They are 
not, as scientific theories are, assertions or contentions as to what is or 
what is not the case . . . . On the contrary, those major positions con-
cerning punishment which are called deterrent or retributive or reforma-
tive "theories" of punishment are moral claims as to what justifies the 
practice of punishment - claims as to why, morally, it should or may be 
used.56 
A. Introduction 
In any sensible and humane legal order, punishment should be rea-
sonably related to legitimate government ends. Thus, a preliminary 
question is whether shaming may promote a valid government end. A 
second, related concern is whether shaming is a humane and fair 
means of achieving that end. 
Classical penology identifies four ends of punishment of criminal 
offenders: retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. 57 
Some authors have posited supplementary reasons for government-im-
posed punishment, such as that it satisfies and controls passion and 
thereby promotes efficiency in norm enforcement,58 or that it pro-
motes a moral education.59 Nevertheless, the classical justifications 
loot from unrepentant criminals than if she receives an apology, but not money, from a truly 
contrite one. E. GoFFMAN, supra, at 116. The effectiveness of an apology sanction, like that of 
shaming sanctions in general, thus hinges on a number of psychological and social variables, 
which may vary among crimes, victims, and perpetrators. 
56. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 72 (1968). 
57. See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES - LAW WITHOUT ORDER 106 
(1972) (defining retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence). 
58. See, e.g., Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 
28 RUTGERS L. REV. 861 (1975). 
59. See, e.g., Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & Pun. AFP. 
208 (1984); Introduction to CoNTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND Jus-
TIFICATIONS 5 (R. Gerber & P. McAnary eds. 1972). The moral education theory seems to be 
one form of rehabilitation, to the extent that it seeks to reform the criminal and encourage right· 
thinking as a path to right-acting. It is also a form of deterrence, to the extent that the moral 
"education" inherent in public punishment is directed both at the offender and the onlookers. 
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still dominate philosophical debates about punishment. In the follow-
ing sections, I describe briefly these classical justifications, and apply 
them to modem shaming sanctions. I conclude that as a theoretical 
matter, shaming may be justifiable under any of the classical theories 
of punishment. I further conclude, however, that these four general 
theories, taken together, offer abstract, theoretical justifications for 
nearly any negative response to criminal behavior. Thus, the more 
critical inquiries are whether the shaming penalties in fact will pro-
mote any of these theoretical ends, and whether shaming is a humane 
way to achieve these ends. 
B. Retribution 
Retributivists argue that punishment is justified by the desire to 
counteract or "compensate" for the harm inflicted by the wrongdoer. 
It is, in short, retaliation against someone who "deserves it." "An eye 
for an eye" is proper redress for a crime, in order to set right the moral 
balance. 60 This focus is retrospective, and weighs only the value that 
the offender has denied society. 
Modem law construes crime as an offense against the state. 61 As 
such, the harm to be redressed is the injury to society, and is measured 
through its eyes. The damage to the victim is relevant only to the 
extent that she is part of the larger society. Retribution thus is not 
satisfied by victim compensation per se. Likewise, an individual vic-
tim's assessment of the harm inflicted is not dispositive. 
Retributive justice is nonconsequentialist in that it is uninterested 
in influencing the offender's future behavior or the behavior of other 
community members. It presupposes free will by the criminal actor 
The hope, I assume, is that they all will "learn something'' and avoid breaching these moral 
lessons in the future. Punishment as "homily" might also satisfy retributivist ends if its delivery 
makes victims feel more "whole." Thus the moral education theory is not a distinct justification 
or theory of punishment. Rather, it is one tool for promoting norm enforcement. Cf. E. DURK-
HEIM, THE DIVlSION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (G. Simpson trans. 1933) (describing the 
goal of punishment as the affirmation of a co=on morality by expressing outrage at the breach 
of the legaVsocial order). 
60. See, e.g., H.LA. HART, supra note 56, at 233-35. But Hart also acknowledged that 
different justifications for punishment become relevant at different points in a "morally accepta-
ble account of punishment." Id. at 3. His definition of retributivism takes into account the 
voluntary nature of the wrongful act· and whether the return of suffering to the offender is itself 
just as good. Id. at 231. 
Kant and Hegel are among the most prominent adherents to the view that the main justifica-
tion of punishment is retribution, and that this is an end in and of itself. Some theology comports 
with this view, though the reconciliation there is between a deity and man; it is not an earth-
bound exchange. See W. TSAO, RATIONAL APPROACH TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 7-8 (1955). 
For example, retributive principles are expressed in Judea-Christian writings. Leviticus 24:17-22. 
61. This construction has been the subject of mounting criticism, which has been described 
as the "victim's rights" movement. For a description and critique of this movement, see Hender-
son, supra note 55, at 942-53. 
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and demands a "proportional" negative response to her willful wrong-
doing. 62 As such, the theory tends to ignore contextual or individual 
complexities in favor of the criminal act itself. Retributive punish-
ment thus is both an emotional expression of disgust and an exacting 
of commensurate revenge that is meant to satisfy moral notions about 
just deserts. Retributivists believe that what goes around should come 
around (though they may disagree about why); the aim of punishment 
is to see that it does come around. 
The primary attraction of retributivism is that it has ancient roots, 
and satisfies deep emotional, intuitive instincts. Moreover, its ends are 
simply stated and seem fairly easy to secure. We punish in order to 
avenge the harm, not to deter, rehabilitate, or contain. Revenge is 
easier to accomplish than these other objectives. 
In recent decades retributivists have gained adherents, 63 in part be-
cause of widespread skepticism about the rehabilitative or deterrence 
effects of contemporary sanctions, 64 and also because some people fear 
the potential for abuse and the disproportionality of rehabilitation-
based punishment schemes. Retribution has become an appealing al-
ternative to these other less favored theories65 because it justifies pun-
ishment even when no deterrence or rehabilitation results. 
Pure retributivist principles can justify the new shaming practices. 
If, for example, a driver kills a young child in the course of operating a 
motor vehicle while intoxicated, forcing the driver to wear a sign in 
public does promote retribution ends in a simple sense. The penalty 
need not, under retribution theory, deter others or convince the de-
fendant not to drive while drunk again. Its justification lies in the fact 
that the defendant broke the law, and so "deserves" to be punished 
regardless of any future effects of the punishment. If wearing a sign 
62. Montesquieu, writing in the eighteenth century, emphasized proportionality as a neces-
sary element of just punishment. Beccaria, writing in the same century, likewise stressed propor· 
tionality. See W. TSAO, supra note 60, at 29-30. 
63. See Berns, Retribution as a Ground for Punishment, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: IS-
SUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (F. Baumann & K. Jensen eds. 1989); Gardner, The Renaissance of 
Retribution -An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781; Henderson, supra note 
55, at 945-48; Robinson, Moral Science, Social Science, and The Idea of Justice, in CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT: lssUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 15; Rush, supra note 34, at 396 n.5. A 
different, perhaps related approach - which emphasizes the victim as the focus of criminal law 
- is the "restitutionary approach." This approach argues that restitution to victims, other in-
jured parties, and society should be the purpose of punishment. See, e.g., C. ABEL & F. MARSH, 
PUNISHMENT AND R.ESTrrurioN 12 (1984). Still another contemporary turn on retribution the· 
ory is a recent article that develops a moral-emotive theory of punishment based on retributivist 
assumptions. See Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 
74 CoRNELL L. REv. 655 (1989). 
64. Henderson, supra note 55, at 945-48. 
65. The only other alternative to deterrence and rehabilitation is incapacitation, which poses 
its own practical and moral difficulties. See infra section 111.E. 
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exacts pain, then it is justified by the offender's past pain-inflicting 
acts. Community outrage is expressed, and the moral calculus is set 
right. 
Of course, pure retributivism, and thus any retributivist-based at-
tempt to justify signs, rests on fairly shallow reasoning,66 namely, that 
the law has to punish crime, however it can. Major objections to pure 
retributivism, 67 which apply equally to retributivist justifications for 
shaming, are that it does not prevent the abuses of unequal, dispropor-
tional, or inhumane punishment. 68 
Even for a pure retributivist, however, the question remains 
whether, in a particular community, wearing a sign or apologizing 
would be perceived as a negative sanction, and thus would satisfy the 
community's interest in revenge. I address this issue in a later section. 
C. Rehabilitation 
A second, also controversial, justification for punishment is reha-
bilitation of offenders. This theory is easily stated and understood: 
the government punishes offenders in order to change their norm-vio-
lating ways. 69 Punishment therefore should promote specific deter-
rence ends, that is, deterrence of this particular offender. It may do so 
through negative stimuli, so that the offender fears being punished 
again and so avoids the behavior, or through training and opportuni-
66. "Retributivism" does not necessarily tell us when, or which, criminals "deserve it." Is 
punishment triggered by a conviction? Only an "accurate" conviction? Only an accurate convic-
tion for violation of a "good" law? Also, as Packer has explained, some retributivists believe that 
the punishment is for the criminal's own good. It is a means by which she realizes her moral 
character. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 38 (1968). Others argue 
that it is for society's sake. Id. at 37-38. Pure retributivists, however, can argue it is for neither 
the criminal nor society's sake, and ignore consequences altogether. 
67. See, e.g., o.w. HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 45 (1881) (describing retribution as "only 
vengeance in disguise"); J. BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 179-89 
(1907) (implicitly rejecting retribution in favor of deterrence theory). 
68. For example, retributivism presupposes that commensurability is a workable guidepost 
for punishment. But what precisely does "an eye for an eye" mean? In what way, if at all, can 
the sentencer ascertain the "proportionality" of a punishment for drunk driving or child molesta-
tion? "An eye for an eye" is one thing; a "sign for a molestation or human life" quite another. 
The sign sanction may be too much, too different, or too little, depending on one's perspective, a 
perspective one can justify only by entirely subjective, intuitive assessments of "equal harm." 
A second problem lies in the pure retributivists' questionable assumption of free will. For 
example, if a drunk driver is an alcoholic, is her moral culpability the same as a DUI offender 
unaffiicted by this disease? Unless the preliminary, and highly problematic, assumption of free 
will is irrebuttable, then individual factors like alcoholism pose tough complicating factors for 
retribution theory in general and thus also for retributivist justifications of shaming. To ignore 
these factors may result in disproportionate, unequal, and inhumane punishment. Yet, if one 
admits some individual factors into the inquiry, then it becomes difficult to justify blanket exclu-
sion of others, such as environmental or situational pressures that may make drinking and driv-
ing more or less the product of "free will." Problems of determinism and free will are 
inescapable, unless one ignores them completely, which only pure retributivists are willing to do. 
69. See F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2-4 (1981). 
1894 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1880 
ties for reflection that actually change the defendanf s attitude as well 
as her behavior.10 
Rehabilitation theory gained popularity in the United States dur-
ing the late 1800s, and dominated penal philosophy during most of the 
1900s.71 Despite the initial promise of rehabilitation as a humane and 
sensible organizing principle of punishment, however, its appeal 
waned.72 The central reason for this decline was that the practical 
complexity, coupled with the extreme moral complexity, of refash-
ioning human character to cabin or obliterate criminal instincts over-
whelmed reformers. 73 
Indeed, the rising doubts about whether rehabilitation is a convinc-
ing justification for punishment go deeper than skepticism about 
whether prisons reform offenders. Some observers question whether 
any feasible, humane punishment method can reform criminals. They 
argue that the people most in need of "character reform" are most 
impervious to it. Environmental, economic, biogenetic, psychological, 
and other external and internal factors in place before and after the 
rehabilitative intervention are, they claim, far more influential on of-
fender character and behavior than any state-imposed intervention can 
ever be. 
Moreover, some critics observe, successful rehabilitation may be 
difficult to assess. An offender can beguile her therapists, the parole 
board, or others into believing that she has "really changed" this time, 
and has powerful incentives to engage in such a charade. Measuring 
rehabilitation of a human being thus can be as difficult as predicting 
70. I include both reactions as evidence of rehabilitation, though pure rehabilitation antici-
pates the latter, complete character metamorphosis, whereas specific deterrence does not. Pro-
fessor Blecker describes the distinction between pure rehabilitation and specific deterrence as 
follows: 
Specific deterrence and rehabilitation do overlap. Perhaps specific deterrence is a threat of 
repeating a bad time inside [prison], whereas rehabilitation is a promise of a better time 
outside. ... 
Rehabilitation - or reformation - essentially consists in the acquisition of attitudes, 
values, habits and skills by which an "enlightened" criminal comes to value himself as a 
valid member of a society in which he can function productively and lawfully. 
Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1197 (1990). 
71. See F. ALLEN, supra note 69, at 5-7. Allen marks the decline of the rehabilitative ideal as 
occurring in 1970s. Id. 
72. See id. at 24-25 (describing critiques of rehabilitation theory). 
73. See H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 55-58. For example, incarceration does not seem to 
reform criminals, as its early advocates hoped it would. On the contrary, prison may congeal 
criminal characters and teach inmates new norm-breaking skills, see, e.g., Blecker, supra note 70, 
at 1192-202, or may even be an attractive setting to some few prisoners. See, e.g., Duncan, 
"Cradled on the Sea:" Positive Images of Prison and Theories of Punishment, 16 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 
1201, 1219-30 (1988). Current recidivism rates also suggest that a rehabilitation justification for 
imprisonment is implausible. Ex-prisoners simply are not forswearing crime in large numbers. 
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her future dangerousness, which is difficult indeed. 14 
Despite these and other criticisms of rehabilitation theory, a con-
firmed rehabilitationist could argue that experience proves only that 
our past methods do not reform offenders, not that rehabilitation can-
not ever work. Absent proof to the contrary, she might add, shaming 
sanctions can be justified under rehabilitation theory. If, for example, 
a particular offender were sufficiently pained by wearing a sign that 
announced her status as a convicted felon, then she might be "scared 
straight," and refrain from committing that offense in the future. 
More obviously, if an offender is compelled to apologize to, or interact 
with victims, then she might become sensitized to the human conse-
quences of criminal acts. The experience might cause her to realize 
more fully her responsibility to others and thus to avoid conduct that 
could imperil them. Shaming therefore can be justified under rehabili-
tation theory, provided that the evidence, which is not yet available, 
bears out that this "rehabilitation" in fact influences behavior. 75 
In sum, rehabilitation theory arguably offers an analytically sound 
defense of shaming practices. Because, however, rehabilitation theory 
· anticipates offender reform, the rehabilitation-based justification for 
shaming ultimately depends on whether a particular shame sanction in 
fact will effect this consequence. 76 
D. Dete"ence 
According to deterrence theory, the primary goal of punishment is 
not to reform the offender or to cancel the moral debt of her crime; it 
is to prevent future crimes.77 Deterrence theory holds that society in-
74. See, e.g., Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 110 (1984) 
(discussing the inaccuracy of clinical estimations of future dangerousness). 
75. Less clear is whether exile-type sanctions would promote rehabilitation ends. The 
message of banishment seems quite the opposite: you are beyond reform, and so must be ex-
pelled. For example, Aristotle wrote that "punishments and penalties should be imposed on 
those who disobey and are of inferior nature, while the incurably bad should be completely ban-
ished." THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARlsTOTLE 271 (D. Ross trans. 1966) (emphasis ad-
ded). The only conceivable rehabilitation-based justification for permanent exile would be that 
the loss of social identity in one community might hurt enough to discourage the offender from 
risking banishment from another. Thus banishment might be an attempt at "transcommunity" 
rehabilitation. It seems very unlikely, however- at least to me- that those who banish offend-
ers are acting out of rehabilitation instincts, or that banishment has reforming effects. Absent the 
opportunity to and the formal means of rejoining the community post-banishment, the more 
compelling justification for banishment is containment - that is, an attempt to protect the com-
munity from the offender by keeping her removed from them. For shaming sanctions, in con-
trast, rehabilitation-type justifications do make sense and may well be the reason that some 
modern reformers favor these methods. 
76. See infra section VI.C. 
77. See generally J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 1 (1974); PANEL ON RE-
SEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, NATL. ACADEMY OF Ser., DETER-
RENCE AND INCAPACITATION: EsnMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME 
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flicts punishment on wrongdoers in order to deter the commission of 
similar delicts by the same offender (specific deterrence) or by others 
(general deterrence). Indeed, a significant number of philosophers in-
sist that deterrence is the only legitimate end of punishment, 78 pro-
vided that the punishment is not unreasonably harsh. Certainly, 
deterrence figures prominently in most W estem theories of 
punishment. 79 
The primary objections to deterrence theory are practical ones, 
though theoretical objections surely can be, and have been, made. 80 
The common practical complaints are, first, that deterrence effects are 
virtually impossible to gauge accurately,81 and second, that the theory 
wrongly presupposes that criminal acts are motivated by rational, 
cost-benefit analyses by wrongdoers. 82 The theory also assumes that 
RATES 4 (1978) [hereinafter DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION] (deterrent effects indicated 
by an inverse relationship between sanction levels and crime rates). The philosophical founda-
tion traditionally invoked in support of deterrence theory is utilitarianism. Punishment is re-
garded as an evil that contributes to the greatest good for the greatest number by preventing a 
greater evil. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 171; H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 39. 
78. c. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 75 (1953); J. BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 
179-89. 
79. Blecker, supra note 70, at 1173 (pointing out the roots of deterrence theory in Plato's 
writings). 
80. For example, some philosophers point out that if deterrence is one's sole theory of pun· 
ishment, then one would not object to the punishment of an innocent person in order to deter 
others. Also, if general deterrence is the only end, then we need not actually punish offenders; 
apparent threats are sufficient. To a utilitarian, then, "real justice" is irrelevant, as long as others 
are deterred. 
81. For a discussion of the difficulties of assessing the deterrent effects of punishment, see 
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 61-63. 
82. See, e.g., J. ANDENAES, supra note 77, at 42-44 (describing critiques of deterrence theory 
that question the assumption of rational behavior by potential offenders). In his historical ac-
count of capital punishment, G.R. Scott suggests that public punishments may not deter crime. 
G. Scorr, THE HlsrORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1950). The following interview is of a 
convict whose death sentence had been remitted, though he had been "within an ace of being 
hanged for coining." Id. at 63. 
Q: "Have you often seen an execution?" 
A: "Yes, often." 
Q: "Did not it frighten you?" 
A: "No - why should it? 
Q: "Did it not make you think that the same would happen to yourself?" 
A: "Not a bit." 
Q: "What did you think then?" 
A: "Think? Why, I thought it was a - shame." 
Q: "Now when you have been going to run a great risk of being caught and hanged, did 
the thought never come into your head, that it would be as well to avoid the risk?" 
A: "Never." 
Q: "Not when you remembered having seen men hanged for the same thing?" 
A: "Oh! I never remembered anything about it; and if I had, what difference would that 
make. We must all take our chance. I never thought it would fall on me, and I don't 
think it ever will." 
Id. 
Such anecdotes fuel our worst nightmares about crime. We prefer to think that most people 
can, and do, imagine themselves "on the gallows," and that this possible scenario curbs law· 
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sanctions can inspire fear in some, or most, onlookers. Different peo-
ple, however, experience fear differently. The punishment thus must 
be one that scares a significant number of would-be perpetrators. 83 
The assumed causal link between threat and deterrence cannot be 
verified without better knowledge than we currently possess, both 
about the specific causes of norm-violating behavior, and about the 
relation between deterrence and personality. In a well-known study of 
deterrence, Zimring and Hawkins illustrate the byzantine complexity 
of tracing the effect of legal threats84 on human behavior. For exam-
ple, intuition probably suggests that a legal sanction would decrease 
the attractiveness of the sanctioned conduct. In fact, however, a sanc-
tion can actually enhance the attractiveness of the proscribed conduct, 
though this reaction may not be sustained. 85 That is, a sanction can 
place both positive and negative value on an activity, and "no general 
statement can be made about which pull will be stronger."86 Empiri-
cal proof of the assumptions on which deterrence theory rests there-
fore depends on extremely complex assessments of human motivation 
breaking instincts. That is, shame sanctions, like legal threats in general, presuppose a positive 
correlation between negative penalties for a behavior and avoidance of it. But the prospect of 
shame may not necessarily provide avoidance. Whether and to what extent it does hinge on 
multiple, contradictory theories about criminal personality and about subcultures of deviance. 
Sigmund Freud, for one, believed that criminals committed bad acts in order to be caught 
and punished. He theorized that unresolved, unconscious guilt and anxiety lead offenders to 
commit the acts and be punished. S. FREUD, THE EGo AND THE ID (1961). That is, whatever 
motivates nondeviant members of society to conform to established norms may not motivate 
deviants. If Freud was correct, then adding to or "piling on" more stigma to conviction penalties 
may not deter a larger population than already is deterred by the prospect of conviction and 
punishment. Those who are susceptible to this sort oflegal threat tend to obey the laws anyway. 
Those who do not obey laws are unlikely to be deterred more by the additional stigmatizing effect 
of public shame than by conviction and conventional punishments. The key to controlling this 
group might be increasing their perceived chances of getting caught - though according to 
Freud, even certain apprehension would not deter some offenders, because they may want to be 
caught. 
Other commentators likewise present a psychological portrait of criminal subcultures that 
undermines strong deterrence claims for shame sanctions. Reporting on this work, one article 
notes that some theorists describe the offender as someone who "does not experience real guilt or 
shame concerning bis crimes . . • • Indeed, the successful offender is described as triumphant •••. 
[The] criminal is always self-confident and never thinks of bis actions as being morally wrong." 
Frazier & Meisenbelder, Exploratory Notes on Criminality and Emotional Ambivalence, 8 QUALI-
TATIVE Soc. 266, 268 (1985) (describing the work of Yocbelson and Samenow). 
Likely a more accurate profile, however, is that most criminals believe not that their acts are 
morally correct, but that they are in some way emotionally satisfying, justified, or "thrilling." Id. 
at 271. To most offenders, then, doing wrong is not intrinsically good, but it may seem worth it. 
83. See w. TSAO, supra note 60, at 58-59; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 245-48 
(1973). 
84. Zimring and Hawkins coined the phrase "legal threat." See F. ZIMRING & G. HAW-
KINS, supra note 83, at 91-92. 
85. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 94-96; see also J. KATZ, SEDUCTIONS 
OF CRIME: THE MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTION OF DOING EVIL (1988). 
86. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 96. 
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and behavior. Given these complexities, the deterrence literature is 
equivocal and not at all susceptible to simple summaries. 
Deterrence theorists do agree, however, that strong socialization is 
a significant predictor of law-abiding behavior. AB Zimring and Haw-
kins observe, "social disapproval, which is an important part of most 
threatened consequences, will be carefully avoided by the strongly so-
cialized individual."87 Thus, legal threats are most likely to be effec-
tive in constraining the behavior of strongly socialized people, who 
already tend not to engage in criminal behavior. Many deterrence the-
orists also believe, despite the lack of absolute empirical proof, both 
that legal threats impose at least some constraint on deviant behavior, 
and that legal threats' best justification lies in this desirable effect. 88 
A deterrence theorist likely would conclude that, as a theoretical 
matter, shaming sanctions probably are justifiable. Signs and apolo-
gies - like any other negative consequence of a criminal conviction -
might deter the specific offender or other would-be offenders from 
committing similar acts. 89 And, like all penalties, shaming sanctions 
should deter most effectively those people who are most strongly so-
cialized. This means, of course, that the population most vulnerable 
to humiliatory punishments probably includes mainly, if not only, 
those people who least need them as an incentive to avoid wrongdoing. 
But a deterrence theorist might respond that this merely indicates that 
shaming sanctions may be redundant deterrence tools; it does not 
mean that deterrence ends cannot justify these sanctions. 
Deterrence of future wrongdoing thus may be an adequate justifi-
cation for the new shaming sanctions. Indeed, the judges and legisla-
tors who have proposed shaming sanctions probably believe quite 
87. Id. at 120. Gerber and McAnary have made a similar point, concluding as follows: 
The prevention of crime as a goal of society is not ultimately achieved by either crass fear or 
huge detention centers but by a successful communication of disapproval. It is n moral 
process which depends for its success on a widely accepted system oflaw which reflect[s] n 
consensus of values and embod[ies] a fairness in procedure that guarantees equality of 
enforcement. 
Introduction to CoNTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS, 
supra note 59, at 5. 
88. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 93; see also J. ANDENAES, supra note 
77, at 16-29; Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 452-53 
(1969). This belief is weakened by data that tend to show that existing sanctions, especially 
incarceration, are not significant deterrents of criminal behavior. See, e.g., DETERRENCE AND 
INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 37-42, 59-63. 
89. Whether banishment is meant to serve even general deterrence ends, however, is ques-
tionable. Again, the more likely purpose is containment, not deterrence. But the threat of expul-
sion surely would frighten community members who value community acceptance. See Liggio, 
The Transportation of Criminals: A Brief Political-Economic History, in AssESSING THE CRIMI· 
NAL: REsrrruTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 273, 281-83 (R. Barnett & J. 
Hagel eds. 1977). 
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strongly that the threat of social ostracism will deter people from com-
mitting similar crimes. As was true of rehabilitation theory, however, 
deterrence theory is consequentialist; as such, a complete justification 
of shaming based on deterrence theory must consider whether the as-
sumed deterrence consequences of these new sanctions actually occur. 
The critical inquiry for deterrence theorists thus becomes whether 
shaming in fact will prevent future crimes. 90 
E. Incapacitation 
The final classical justification for shaming sanctions is incapacita-
tion. Incapacitation theory holds that punishment should protect the 
community from the offender, either by confining her physically, or 
otherwise disabling her from committing future crimes.91 An in-
capacitationist favors external controls on an offender with demon-
strated criminal propensities, rather than relying on the offender's 
capacity for self-control. Imprisonment, banishment, home electronic 
surveillance, branding, mutilation, chemical treatment, and castration 
all are examples of incapacitative punishments.92 Each seeks either to 
physically remove the offender from society, or to make criminal acts 
substantially more difficult to perform. 
Incapacitation theory has at least two significant weaknesses. The 
first is that it assumes that we can predict which criminals pose an 
ongoing risk of harm. Incapacitationists often rely on past criminal 
activity, demographic factors, or other variables as strong predictors 
of future criminal activity. If these variables do not yield accurate 
predictions, however, then some offenders will be punished who do 
not, in an incapacitationist's sense, "deserve" it. The second weak-
ness, according to some observers, is that the theory is too forgiving of 
some offenders. Incapacitationists believe that offenders who pose no 
future risk to the community should not be punished, though they 
may have committed quite serious criminal acts. For example, "heat 
of passion" murderers, or other criminals who act on situation-specific 
or person-specific impulses and are unlikely to commit future trans-
gressions, can be released if they pose little or no danger to others. To 
retributivists in particular, this is an unacceptable response to a serious 
injury. 
Despite these potential shortcomings, incapacitation theory offers 
support to the shaming sanctions. Public apologies, confessions, or 
90. See infra section VI.B. 
91. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 48-53. 
92. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
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signs may well be incapacitative, in that they might make future crimi-
nal acts more difficult for the offender to perform. Publicizing the of-
fender's identity may alert community members of her criminal past 
and cause them to isolate her socially or professionally. People might, 
for example, refuse a convicted embezzler a position that gives her 
access to funds. A known child molester may be denied contact with 
children. And a convicted drunk driver may be refused alcohol or a 
job that involves use of a vehicle. As such, the shaming sanctions may 
have a disabling effect on the offenders, and thus may claim to serve 
incapacitation-type ends. 
F. Conclusion 
The traditional theories of punishment suggest that all of the new 
shaming sanctions can be justified under one or several of the basic 
theories. Indeed, any and all forms of punishment that our contempo-
rary legal order might concoct likely would be consistent with at least 
one of these four capacious and controversial theories. 
In the United States, no one theory clearly dominates all criminal 
punishment practices in a coherent, comprehensive way. Rather, jus-
tifications that courts and legislatures offer for punishment practices 
seem to reflect a pluralistic theory of punishment. As such, the polit-
ical acceptability of any punishment technique, including shame sanc-
tions, will depend on whether the evidence indicates that it actually 
promotes any of the four classical ends of punishment, rather than on 
whether it promotes a particular end. That is, does the new shaming 
in fact deter, rehabilitate, or incapacitate criminals, or exact propor-
tional revenge for crime? And, if it does promote any of these ends in 
fact, is this shaming a reasonably humane way to further these ends? 
In the remaining sections, I explore both the likely practical effective-
ness and the humaneness of shaming. 
IV. THE EMOTION OF "SHAME" 
Were they ashamed when they had committed abomination? Nay, they 
were not at all ashamed, neither could they blush.93 
In order to evaluate both the practical effectiveness and the hu-
maneness of a shaming sanction, one first must define the phenomenon 
of shame and identify the conditions under which it occurs. The key 
sources of this definition and the conditions of shame are psychologi-
cal and anthropological materials. 
Psychological studies demonstr~te the complexity and gravity of 
93. Jeremiah 6:15. 
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the shame emotion, and the extreme difficulty that judges are likely to 
experience if they attempt to craft sanctions that match offender-spe-
cific definitions of shame. Psychologists describe shame94 as a highly 
individual experience that strikes at the center of human personality. 
The emotion evoked is a feeling, a "kind of fear of dishonor ... [that] 
produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger."95 This 
feeling is triggered by tension between an individual's ego ideal and 
her conscious or unconscious awareness of the ego's actual potential.96 
Shame forces a downward redefinition of oneself, and causes the 
shamed person to feel transformed into something less than her prior, 
idealized image.97 Wurmser describes the reaction as follows: 
In shame one feels frozen, immovable, paralyzed, even turned into stone 
or into another creature, such as an ass or a pig (not only in jokes, but in 
dreams, delusions, and myths as well); contempt by another has suc-
ceeded in changing the human partner into a mere thing, into a noth-
ing .... The loss of love in shame can be described as a radical decrease 
of respect for the subject as a person with his own dignity; it is a disre-
gard for his having a self in its own right and with its own prestige. . .. 
The thrust of this aggression is to dehumanize. 98 
This dehumanization and social demotion typically occur only 
when a shameful trait or act becomes visible, and is exposed to 
others. 99 Thus, one condition of the shame emotion is an audience. 
As one writer has said, "Shame is essentially public; if no one else 
94. The dictionary defines shame as "a painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt, 
shortcoming, or impropriety in one's own behavior or in the behavior or position of [another]." 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2086 (1986). 
95. THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISrOTLE, supra note 75, at 104-05. 
96. See, e.g., G. PIERS & M. SINGER, SHAME AND GUILT 28-29 (1971). The psychological 
theories that elaborate on shame are fairly recent. Freud and Jung dealt only briefly with the 
emotion of shame in their celebrated works. See generally Hultberg, Shame - A Hidden Emo-
tion, 33 J. ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 109, 111-13 (1988) (offering a brief historical survey on 
the treatment of shame in in-depth psychology). Anthropologists, not psychologists, have em-
phasized the role of shame in their studies. See id. at 113-15. 
97. G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 26-27. 
98. L. WURMSER, THE MAsK OF SHAME 81 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Hultberg, 
supra note 96, at 116. 
99. c. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY 34-35 (1977); see also E. ERIKSON, 
CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 252 (2d ed. 1963) (describing the exposure and visibility inherent in 
shame). 
Psychologists have attempted to distinguish "guilt" from "shame." See, e.g., A. Buss, SELF-
CoNSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL ANxlETY 157, 159-61 (1980) ("Shame is a fear of abandonment; 
guilt is a fear of castration."); H. LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 34-36, 50, 
64 (1958); s. MILLER, THE SHAME EXPERIENCE 140-43 (1985) (distinguishing shame from guilt 
on basis that shame involves attention to a defect in a specific self-image, whereas guilt involves 
attention to one's actions, not one's self-image); L. WURMSER, supra note 98, at 80-82 (conclud-
ing that shame sanctions use contempt as the punishment; guilt sanctions use anger and hatred); 
Frazier & Meisenhelder, supra note 82, at 274-80 (contrasting guilt and shame on basis of 
whether the emotion is based on internal (guilt) or external (shame) controls). 
Some anthropologists have relied on these distinctions to categorize certain cultures as 
"shame" or "guilt" cultures, depending on whether they rely on external or internal sanctions. 
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knows, there is no basis for shame. And if your action is seen, you can 
diminish shame only by running from the group."100 Shaming re-
quires witnesses who will learn of the shameful act and who will con-
demn it. 
The audience to a shaming must include people who are important 
to the offender,101 or she will not be "ashamed." The anxiety that 
shaming exploits is a fear of abandonment or isolation, usually from a 
social group or other community that is necessary or valuable to the 
individual.102 The individual fears that, given the revelation of her 
shameful act and transformation into a lesser self, people will disre-
gard or abandon her. Abandonment or isolation from a group is anxi-
ety-producing only for an individual who shares the values of the 
community or at least fears exposure before them. To be effective, the 
public rebuke therefore must threaten a significant relationship. 103 
Goffman describes shame as a dynamic social exchange in which 
an individual "loses face" or becomes "shamefaced."104 As he defines 
it, face is "the positive social value a person effectively claims for him-
self by the line others assume he has taken during a particular con-
tact. "105 Face is lost 
when information is brought forth in some way about his social worth 
See G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96 at 59-61 (describing and reformulating these distinc-
tions). 
In legal discourse, happily, these fine-tuned psychological distinctions between guilt (internal) 
and shame (external) may be overlooked. As other commentators have observed, criminal law 
theorists need only concern themselves with whether public opinion plays some role in character 
formation and behavior. See J. BRAITiiWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 57 
(1989); Note, A Perspective on Non-Legal Social Controls: The Sanctions of Shame and Guilt in 
Representative Cultural Settings, 35 IND. L.J. 196, 199-204, 206 (1959). They need not decide 
whether negative public opinion evokes "shame" versus the closely related phenomenon of 
"guilt." Consequently, I use the term "shame" throughout, but mean it to include the guilt 
emotion wherever guilt would likewise be produced by public shaming. 
100. A. Buss, supra note 99, at 159; cf. H. LYND, supra note 99, at 27-28 (concluding that 
"[t]he exposure may be to others but, whether others are or are not involved, it is always ••• 
exposure to one's own eyes"); G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 66-68 (observing that the 
audience need not be actual for a person to experience shame; it can be fantasized). 
101. A. Buss, supra note 99, at 160. 
102. See, e.g., G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 29 ("Behind the feeling of shame 
stands not the fear of hatred, but the fear of contempt which, on an even deeper level of the 
unconscious, spells fear of abandonment, the death by emotional starvation."); H. LYND, supra 
note 99, at 67; Hultberg, supra note 96, at 115-16 (Shame "is the fear of being excluded from 
human society. Shame implies fear of total abandonment. It is not a fear of physical death, but 
of psychic extinction."). As Goffman has observed, an individual may violate some social expec-
tation or norm, yet be "untouched by this failure," when the individual is sufficiently alienated 
from the censuring group. He is "protected by identity beliefs of his own, he feels that he is a 
full-fledged normal human being, and that we are the ones who are not quite human." E. 
GoFFMAN, STIGMA 6 (1963). 
103. C. SCHNEIDER, supra note 99, at 36. 
104. E. GOFFMAN, On Face-Work, in INTERACTION RrruAL 5, 8-9 (1967). 
105. Id. at 5. 
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which cannot be integrated ... into the line that is being sustained for 
him .... [He is] out of face when he participates in a contact with others 
without having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are 
expected to take. 106 
In other words, shame requires a social encounter, an interaction be-
tween an individual and the group that exposes weaknesses or deficien-
cies in the individual and that reduces her post-shaming social 
standing or compromises her own idealized prior image. 
Other psychologists likewise stress the social dynamics of shaming. 
John Braithwaite, who has written extensively on shame and punish-
ment, has noted that "[w]hereas an actual punishment will only be 
administered by one person or a limited number of criminal justice 
officials, the shaming associated with punishment may involve almost 
all of the members of a community."107 This means that the /relevant 
audience must experience and must communicate a roughly common 
sense of outrage at, or contempt for, the sanctioned member's actions. 
If all or most of them ignore the spectacle, it loses its sting. This audi-
ence participation often includes withdrawal from the offender. Public 
shaming in many instances is followed by community shunning. In-
deed, shaming exploits one's fear of shunning by others, or banishment 
from the community.10s 
106. Id. at 8; see also E. ERIKSON, supra note 99, at 406 (describing the infantile roots of 
shame and the fear of "loss of face before all-surrounding, mocking audiences"). 
107. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 73. 
108. Exile of an offender may occur in one of two ways. The community may be ordered to, 
or elect to, avoid the offender socially or otherwise; or, the court or other community official may 
take steps to secure her physical or other isolation from the community even absent community 
cooperation. The first type of exile is shunning; the second is banishment. Banishment typically 
is reserved for the most egregious cases, where the offender must be expelled altogether from the 
community or some part thereof. The banishment may be temporary, like a limited-term sen-
tence, or permanent, like lawyer disbarment. 
Banishment represents the ultimate downward manipulation of social identity of an offender. 
In effect, the local identity is erased, eradicated. The shunning is complete and permanent. The 
defendant must effect new contacts elsewhere, and begin a job and life in another community. 
Shunning is a less severe punishment, at least to the extent that the individual remains in the 
community and may have the opportunity to regain her neighbor's approval. 
Shunning and banishment of an offender can serve several functions. First (and likely fore-
most) is the protection of the community from the exiled one. Second is the deterrence of similar 
acts by other remaining members of the community. A third possible function is to prevent 
retaliation by some members of the community toward the offender, and divisive factionalization 
of the group. 
Effective shunning practices, like effective shaming, require audience participation. The audi-
ence must be willing to assume not only the role of approving spectator, but also that of active 
disciplinarian. The penalty's effectiveness depends upon the community's willingness to endorse 
the sentence by avoiding the wrongdoer. Audience complicity of this sort may be secured in 
several ways. Community withdrawal from a wrongdoer is particularly likely to occur in a com-
munity with powerful social and normative cohesion, like the Amish or the gypsies. But it may 
also occur in a community that punishes its members, formally or informally, if they fail to 
cooperate in shunning the offender. This may occur in authoritarian regimes that can inspire 
sufficient fear in its people to secure their cooperation. 
Of course, the members of all communities may shun an offender because they fear harm 
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V. CULTURAL CONTEXT 
The modem cry in W estem countries for community alternatives to the 
established systems of crime control is a belated need for simpler solu-
tions to crime than repression by helicopters, electronics, computeriza-
tion of records, and armed policemen. Unfortunately, the 
"communities" referred to are often not in existence so that despite the 
awareness, such lessons are difficult to learn from the advanced urban 
complexes.109 
A. Introduction 
In addition to the individual-specific psychological meaning of 
shame is a culture-specific110 or anthropological meaning that influ-
ences the effectiveness of a shaming sanction. Because shaming in-
volves audience participation or shunning of the offender or both, 
cultural patterns and norms of behavior partly determine whether the 
audience will participate in the ritual. Also, to the extent that social 
conformity is achieved through a shared sense of shame and guilt, 111 
these emotions necessarily have community- or culture-dependent 
meanings. There is, in other words, a "cultural ego ideal."112 For 
example, if a culture idealizes work as a means of accomplishment, 
from the offender. For example, an employer may be disinclined to hire a convicted thief out of 
fear of her propensity to commit similar bad acts, such as embezzlement. Formalized shunning 
and banishment rituals nevertheless are more characteristic of close-bound, distinctive communi-
ties, than of impersonal, less distinctive cultures. 
109. W. CLIFFORD, CRIME CoNTROL IN JAPAN 17S (1976). 
110. Words like "culture," "community," or "society" have elusive meanings. Goffman cap-
tures this slipperiness in the following passage: 
To say that a particular practice is formed in a given place (or a given class of places) leaves 
a great deal unspecified even when systematically collected data are available. For it is often 
unclear whether it is claimed that the practice occurs throughout the place or only some-
where in it, and if throughout, whether this is the only place it occurs. Furthermore, [some] 
social arrangements and small behaviors .•. have the awkward property of pertaining not to 
a set of individuals that can be bounded nicely, like the citizens of a particular nation state, 
but to groupings whose boundaries we know very little about .•.• In any case, the reference 
unit "American Society" (which I use throughout), is something of a conceptual scandal, 
very nearly a contradiction in terms; the social unit "civilization" (whatever that might 
mean) is as relevant as that of nation state. 
E. GoFFMAN, supra note SS, at xiv-xv. 
The dangers of obscuring contextual complexities by invoking broad-brush terms like "cul-
ture" are massive. Everything that ethnographers say in general about a people or social group 
may be wrong in practical, particular applications. These errors may be compounded when cul-
tural generalizations are plucked from their original anthropological context and applied to new, 
foreign settings, like criminal law theory. Nevertheless, generalizations may offer useful organiz-
ing outlines of significant tendencies in human relations. Goffman himself assumes this, insofar 
as he relies on the reference units of "society" and "Western society" despite his misgivings 
about these words. 
111. See G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at S3-SS (describing the role of shame and 
guilt in socialization of the individual). 
112. Cf. id. at 91 (calling it a cultural "super ego" in reliance on Sigmund Freud's works); H. 
LYND, supra note 99, at 28 ("The particular aspects of the self especially vulnerable to exposure 
differ in different cultures."). 
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then a beggar in that culture "'ought to be ashamed.' " 113 Indeed, 
these cultural meanings may be inescapable.114 Finally, if the purpose 
of official shaming is to deter members of the community from com-
mitting similar acts, then the judge must be able to ascertain and ex-
ploit this shared sense of shame. 
Measurements of the cultural ego ideal, like those of the individual 
ego ideal, are difficult to perform115 given the number and complex 
interaction of variables that give rise to shame. Moreover, the cultural 
meaning of shame varies widely across national cultures and within 
pluralistic, national cultures. Further compounding any attempt to 
describe a cultural meaning of shame is that anthropologists disagree 
about which cultural variables most influence a particular culture's 
definition of shame. For example, some researchers have identified 
childrearing practices as the primary variable that affects both cultural 
and individual meanings of shame.116 Others argue, however, that a 
focus on childrearing alone undervalues other relevant cultural vari-
ables, which may include the society's "beliefs and values, contact and 
conflict with other cultures, and the historical development of particu-
lar institutions in a particular geographical environment.''117 Regard-
less of whether any one factor is dominant, the studies confirm that a 
host of cultural factors can influence which parts of the self will be 
especially vulnerable to public exposure.118 One's susceptibility to the 
sort of moral criticism that "shaming" implies thus depends both on 
cultural variables119 and on the individual experiences already 
113. G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 54-55; see also Kaufman & Raphael, Shame: 
A Perspective on Jewish Identity, J. PSYCHOLOGY & JUDAISM, Spring 1987, at 30, 34 (describing 
sources of shame in contemporary American society, such as failure to succeed, unpopularity, 
and failure to be independent); Myers, Emotions and the Self: A Theory of Personhood and Polit-
ical Order Among Pintupi Aborigines, 7 ETHOS 343, 349 (1979) (describing the cultural under-
standings that may give rise to an emotion - such as shame - or to a sense of its 
appropriateness). 
114. As Piers has observed, "[m]any a Utopian writer has tried to project a society which is 
cohesive without fear of guilt-creating punishment and without shame-producing competition. 
No attempt at realization has succeeded so far." G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 55. 
115. Id. at 83-84. Moreover, these difficulties "are greatly multiplied when the measure-
ments have to be standardized for different cultures." Id. at 83. 
116. See, e.g., F. ELKIN & G. HANDEL, THE CHILD AND SOCIETY: THE PROCESS OF SO-
CIALIZATION 63 (4th ed. 1984). 
117. G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 89. 
118. See H. LYND, supra note 99, at 28. For example, in some cultures death by decapitation 
was viewed as more honorable than death by hanging. In China, however, severance of the head 
from the body was considered a disgraceful death. See G. Scorr, supra note 82, at 167. 
119. Here again, though, I offer a caveat. The anthropological studies may overemphasize or 
misinterpret the significance of shaming among cultures that are foreign to the anthropologist 
observer. For example, although some studies of North American Indian tribes suggest that 
sharp differences exist between the tribal groups and white groups, other investigators have con-
cluded otherwise. See G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 76-78. Moreover, there is a 
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mentioned. 
In the following sections, I describe several cultures in which offi-
cial shaming is, or was, a particularly forceful and common means of 
enforcing norms. The shared characteristics of these cultures lend in-
sight into the cultural conditions under which shaming may be a 
meaningful, effective, and humane sanction. In general, these cultures 
are ones that seem to possess a reasonably coherent, and widely ac-
knowledged, cultural meaning of shame, which officials or community 
leaders can fairly readily exploit to secure adherence to cultural rules. 
B. Pre-World War II Japan - A Paradigmatic Shame Culture 
Anthropologists have identified as shame cultures120 ones in which 
tendency to homogenize the practices of the various tribes, and to deemphasize or distort the 
differences among them. Id. at 76-77. 
120. As indicated in note 99, supra, anthropologists once commonly invoked a conceptual 
model that distinguishes between guilt cultures and shame cultures. See generally Hultberg, 
supra note 96, at 113. The model has been summarized as follows: 
[T]he individual in a guilt culture develops a conscience with firm ideas of right and wrong, 
and, in consequence, submits to certain ethical and moral principles. A guilt culture is one 
in which authority is based on concepts like transgression and punishment, sin but also 
forgiveness, eternal salvation but also eternal damnation, a punishing God but also a 
merciful God. In a shame culture the highest goal is not a clear conscience but a good 
reputation among people •••• In such societies, ridicule is often the hardest punishment 
which can be inflicted on a individual. 
Id. Applying this model, some anthropologists have identified as shame cultures certain Eskimo 
societies, see, e.g., R. Lowra, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 413 (1920) (discussing the song duels em· 
ployed to mock offenders), early Greek culture, see, e.g., E. DODDS, THE GREEKS AND nm 
IRRATIONAL 17-18 (1951); J. REDFIELD, NATURE AND CuLTURE IN TIIE ILIAD 115-19 (1975), 
pre-World War II Japanese culture, see text accompanying notes 121-46 infra, and some North 
American Indian tribes' cultures, see, e.g .• K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 
260-61 (1941) (describing use of satire as form of social control among the Cheyenne); G. PET· 
TIT, PRIMITIVE EDUCATION IN NORTH AMERICA 60-62 (1946) (describing the use by some 
American Indian tribes of opprobrious or ridiculous nicknames to encourage the young Native 
Americans to observe the tribal code of proper behavior). 
Some of these anthropologists rank guilt cultures and shame cultures hierarchically, with 
guilt cultures given more elevated status. Hultberg, supra note 96, at 114. As Hultberg has 
observed, however, this ordering may stem from the relative neglect of shame by psychologists, 
and from the linking of "shame" to certain (disfavored) types of society. Id. Post-reformation 
bourgeois culture, he notes, had strong connections to Protestantism and Puritanism, and thus 
focused more on "guilt" than "shame." Id. The ability to feel guilt, and the absolute distinction 
between right and wrong, were essential to "[keep] people rooted in bourgeois culture, by oblig-
ing them to render account to society for themselves and for their deeds." Id. Bias toward 
bourgeois culture norms thus may explain these anthropologists' notion that guilt cultures are 
"more advanced" than shame cultures. In any event, their dubious hierarchical claim is not 
critical to their descriptive claims. 
One of the anthropologists' descriptive claims is that the decline of Christianity in Western 
European and American cultures and thus of Christian notions of good and evil, may signal a 
shift in these cultures from "guilt" to "shame" sanctions. If consensus about good and evil 
erodes, then authority that is based on the "guilt" concepts of "sin," "transgression," or "for· 
giveness" loses its force. Nevertheless, shame sanctions cannot provide a suitable replacement 
for guilt sanctions unless social consensus of a different sort emerges. This consensus need not be 
about good and evil, but about "face" and the conditions of favorable social standing. 
As a practical legal matter, however, the anthropological distinctions between shame cultures 
and guilt cultures make little difference. In both cultures, broad social consensus is an essential 
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the members make frequent and conscious use of shaming as a means 
of behavior control. Perhaps the best known, or most often invoked, 
example of a shame culture is that of pre-World War II Japan. 
In 1946, cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict published a now 
well-known study on Japanese society. 121 Her theme was of particular 
interest to American readers of the day, as they had just fought a war 
in which understanding the Japanese psyche and cultural traditions 
became important.122 Benedict concluded that shame was "the root of 
virtue"123 for the Japanese people prior to World War II. Their strong 
concern about social judgment, 124 and the likelihood that in this close 
society with relatively little privacy, misconduct would not go unno-
ticed,125 caused Japanese citizens to conform closely to social expecta-
tions. Moreover, if a Japanese person's social standing were attacked, 
she could not count on her family to rally behind her; the family's 
support was contingent on support from the larger community.126 As 
Benedict observes, this is an extraordinary cultural response. In most 
societies, the family group will protect a member under attack. Thus, 
the significance of outside approval to the Japanese was comparatively 
high. 
aspect of effective legal authority. This consensus may emphasize "sin" in a guilt culture, 
whereas it may stress "honor" in a shame culture, but both require broad community cohesive-
ness. Moreover, public shaming may be effective in either culture. One may feel guilt, yet also 
value social approval, so that public revelation of a transgression could trigger both shame and 
guilt. 
Of course, an offender who feels guilt or remorse may not need public "spanking'' to feel 
punished, whereas a remorseless offender might. Thus, under an individualist scheme of punish-
ment, shaming sanctions might be warranted less often in a guilt culture than in a shame culture. 
But unless a society depends solely on offender remorse as an instrument of social control - as 
few modern nation-states do - and uses no public method of punishment, then shame and social 
embarrassment are implicit aspects of its punishment scheme. Thus, any culture or social group 
that relies on public processes to determine guilt and punish offenders can plausibly be character-
ized as a "shame culture" in one sense. Meaningful sorting among cultures therefore turns not 
on whether its members value social approval, but on the extent to which they value it, and the 
extent to which they exploit that vulnerability to enforce social norms. 
121. R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD (1946). 
122. Benedict's data were not gleaned from personal visits to Japan, but from others' writ-
ings about the Japanese, from Japanese films, and from her discussions with Japan-born persons 
living in the United Sates. Id. at 5-8. Despite this methodological deficiency, her work has been 
influential in anthropological studies of Japanese culture. 
123. Id. at 224. 
124. Id. Benedict's theory has been criticized for focusing only on "public shame" and ig-
noring "private shame" in Japanese culture. "Public shame" would not be triggered by praise; 
"private shame" might be. The Japanese word "haji" extends to both types of shame, which in 
English might be called embarrassment (private shame) and shame (public shame). The Japa-
nese are highly sensitive to embarrassment-haji, (or exposure sensitivity), which makes them 
exceptionally vulnerable to shame-haji. See Lebra, Shame and Guilt: A Psychocultural View of 
the Japanese Self. 11 ETHOS 192, 194 (1983) (relying on work by Sakuta). 
125. See infra text accompanying note 139. 
126. See R. BENEDICT, supra note 121, at 273-74. 
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This deference to external estimations of one's value was incul-
cated during childhood. Mothers would teach their children to know 
shame, upon threat of the drastic sanction of withdrawal of family 
affection.127 These early childhood experiences provided "rich soil for 
the fear of ridicule and of ostracism which is so marked in the Japa-
nese grown-up."128 Elders would attempt to protect their children 
from the pain of future shame by schooling them in their obligations 
to the world, and teaching them that failure to meet those obligations 
would, in later life, be greeted with ridicule. The Japanese child there-
fore was taught social etiquette, recognition of and subordination to 
her duties to her neighbors, family, and community, and strong self-
discipline. 129 
The Japanese pattern of childhood training, and the values on 
which it was premised, help place into perspective the deep impor-
tance of one's name in Japan, and the particular seriousness of an in-
sult to a Japanese male's name. Vengeance and even suicide may have 
been necessary to remove the stain in some situations.13° For example, 
if professional commitments were not met, this would bring shame to 
one's name.131 This acute sensitivity to insult and to dishonor to one's 
name also explains some Japanese etiquette. A Japanese person would 
take great care to avoid telling another person to his face that he had 
made a professional error, 132 and to avoid any other shame-causing 
situation that would call into question another's "girl to his name"133 
that is, the obligation to live according to one's station in life.134 
Public rebuke of an individual reared under these cultural condi-
tions surely would strike deep and hard. Shame sanctions in Japan 
during this period therefore likely proved a significant deterrent to vol-
untary, socially disapproved behavior. On an informal level, the fear 
of shame produced conformity. On a formal legal level, this fear could 
127. Id. at 286-87. Through teasing, the mother would cajole the child into socially correct 
behavior. For example, if a child were noisy or disobedient, the mother might say to a visitor, 
"'Will you take this child away? We don't want it.' " Whereupon the visitor would take the 
child and begin to carry it outside the house. Id. at 262. The child would become frightened, 
and promise to be good. When the mother was convinced that the child had learned the lesson, 
she would relent. Id. 
128. Id. at 263. 
129. Id. at 272-73. 
130. Id. at 145. 
131. These standards were set quite high. Thus Benedict reports that school principals com-
mitted suicide because fires at their schools threatened the Emperor's picture - even though the 
fires were not the principals' fault. Id. at 151. 
132. Id. at 152-53. 
133. Id. at 156. 
134. Id. at 149. 
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be reinforced and further manipulated through the publicity of of-
fenses and of punishment. Moreover, the structured and tight-knit na-
ture of Japanese society would have assured widespread agreement 
about the terms of social approval, an essential condition of effective 
shaming and shunning. 
Contemporary studies of crime in Japan suggest that these infor-
mal shaming sanctions continue to work. The fear of shame, and the 
attendant loss of social status, help to explain the low crime rate in 
Japan.135 As one commentator has said, "If crime is the price of free-
dom, then ... it is a price the Japanese are not willing to pay."136 The 
Japanese observe the restraints on freedom that these social expecta-
tions impose, in part because they can only escape them by leaving 
Japan or by living a life separate from the social structure, which is an 
extremely lonely life in Japan.137 Once an individual "opts" out of the 
structure by refusing to conform, it is extremely difficult to reenter, 
because seniority is given great value. The prodigal must begin anew 
at the bottom.138 
There is also little chance that a breach of the social compact will 
go unnoticed.139 The Japanese today continue to live in close physical 
proximity, and are subject to an informal sort of "surveillance," inso-
far as people take an interest in each other's doings. Deviant conduct 
is difficult to hide.140 
Taken together, these anthropological insights demonstrate the re-
lationship between effective social, informal policing, and governmen-
tal enforcement of rules of behavior. Japan can rely to a significant 
extent on nongovernmental measures to control deviant behavior be-
cause the Japanese culture observes, and has in place informal instru-
ments to enforce, fairly clear and coherent cultural standards.141 
135. See W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 8-9. But see supra text accompanying note 81, 
regarding the tenuous nature of speculations about causation with crime control measures. 
136. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 8. 
137. Id. at 8-9. 
138. Id. Clifford notes: 
each one in Japan has a recognized position to fill in the scheme of things, and he is expected 
to live up to it. The Japanese society is so constructed that if he does live up to it, then he 
will benefit; if he does not live up to it, then he will be despised and bring shame on all those 
connected with him. And if he should choose to break out of the system, to become a free-
lancer, to live as a gypsy or to be unconventional in some way, then he is free to do so, but 
he can expect to have a very difficult time - all the more difficult if he tries to get back into 
the system later. 
Id. at 10. 
139. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
140. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 13-14. 
141. Id. at 8-11; see also Lebra, supra note 124, at 192-93. This is not meant to suggest that 
the modem Japanese all share a common faith or uniform set of values. In fact they embrace a 
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Given the Japanese emphasis on social responsibilities and on sub-
ordination to one's role within that social structure, some formal pun-
ishments that are effective in Japan fit poorly, if at all, into other 
cultures' punishment schemes. For example, for some crimes, Japa-
nese prisoners are given the option of volunteering for a one-week ex-
ercise of intensive self-observation, in which the prisoner is isolated 
except for visits by a teacher or sensei. 142 The object of the seclusion 
and instruction is to encourage the prisoner "to see his own personal-
ity in its relation with others as a function of those relationships."143 
The prisoner is encouraged to blame himself for his complaints, and to 
recognize his debt to his family.144 
This emphasis on the individual's relationship to the community is 
both striking and significant. The community, in turn, reinforces and 
rewards obedience to social duty. Thus, while manipulation of one's 
fear of shame may seem a harsh tool for assuring obedience, the indi-
vidual receives positive affirmation in exchange for her compliance. 
Moreover, this punishment scheme is not wholly unforgiving; it allows 
for reacceptance of a contrite offender. As John Braithwaite has put 
it, Japan shames "reintegratively."145 By "follow[ing] shaming cere-
monies with ceremonies of repentance and reacceptance ... [t]he 
moral order derives a very special kind of credibility when even he 
who has breached it openly comes out and affirms the evil of the 
breach."146 Thus, the stakes are high when one defies the moral order, 
but total social banishment is a rare consequence: the offender may 
humble himself and thereby be reintegrated into the social fabric. 
diffusion of values. Nevertheless, the Japanese, prompted by tradition and habit, tend to con· 
tinue to meet the expectations of those around them. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 177-78. 
142. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 94. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. Contrast this method and underlying theory with imprisonment in the United 
States and the underlying religious thinking during the early nineteenth century. Prisoners 
would be confined to their cells and given only a Bible to read. They might receive religious 
instruction from ministers or lay persons. See S. WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE 74 (1980). The 
methodology was inspired by Matthew 25:36: "I was in prison and ye came unto me." S. 
WALKER, supra, at 73. Today the prisoner might also, or instead, receive psychotherapy or 
counseling as a resocialization mechanism. Yet the ends of this psychotherapy differ from those 
of Japanese psychotherapy. Lebra describes the Japanese therapeutic method of Naikan, in 
which the client, under the guidance of a counselor, reflects in isolation on his faults in relation to 
the people most important to him, especially his mother. Lebra, supra note 124, at 205. Even in 
psychotherapy, the Japanese individual's obligation to her community and family is stressed to a 
degree unmatched in most American cultures. 
Lebra emphasizes that Japan is not only a shame culture in Benedict's sense, but also a guilt 
culture. Id. at 193. Again, the nearly inextricable nature of the emotions of guilt and shame 
make distinctions between them hazy, if not chimerical. 
145. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 74. 
146. Id. 
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C. Shaming Rituals in Other Cultures 
Though Japan offers a paradigmatic instance of a shame culture, 
many cultures likewise achieve significant social control and norm ob-
servation through shaming techniques. Lowie reported during the 
early 1900s that various Eskimo tribes relied on public embarrassment 
as a response to crimes against tribe members.147 Although the vari-
ous Eskimo settlements were separate societies with little political co-
hesion among them, within each settlement the Eskimo tribe was 
strongly cohesive. Thus the tribe could rely on the informal adjust-
ment of grievances, rather than on a central governing agency .148 One 
such informal Eskimo adjustment technique was the "song duel."149 
The duels were ways of sanctioning various behaviors, such as infidel-
ity, destruction of property, and theft, among others.15o The victim of 
the misdeed would compose a satirical song to mock the perpetrator 
and then challenge him to a public song duel.151 Lowie describes the 
duel as follows: 
Drumming and chanting, [the challenger] throws his enemy's misdeeds 
into his teeth, exaggerating and deriding them and even rattling the fam-
ily skeletons as well. The accused person receives the mockery with 
feigned composure and at the close of the challenger's charge returns in 
kind . . . . The spectators follow proceedings with the greatest interest, 
egging on the performers to their utmost efforts. 152 
Using these song duels, the Eskimos sought to preserve the social or-
der without violence or other formal coercion. 
A somewhat similar custom - the vito - historically was ob-
served by villages in southern Spain.153 The villagers would visit an 
offender's house at night and make a great noise and yell abusive 
songs. This annoyance could become so bothersome that the culprit 
would eventually decide to leave the area, thereby effecting a sort of 
constructive banishment.154 Indeed, the fear of being mocked in pub-
lic operates as a powerful sanction in most Mediterranean cultures, 
given the important role of honor and shame to Mediterranean 
147. See R. LoWIE, supra note 120, at 412-15. 
148. Id. at 413. 
149. Id.; see generally A. RADc:LIFFE-BRoWN, STRUCTURE AND FuNCTioN IN PRIMmVE 
SOCIETY 205-11 (1952) (describing range of negative sanctions used by various cultures to 
achieve obedience to norms, from organized to diffuse, and from formal legal to informal social). 
150. R. Low1E, supra note 120, at 413. 
151. Rasmussen, Observations on the Intellectual Culture of the Caribou Eskimos, in VII 
REPORT OF THE FIFTH THULE EXPEDffiON No. 2, at 73 (1930). 
152. R. LoWIE, supra note 120, at 413. 
153. See J. BEATIIE, OrnER CuLTURES 172 (1964). 
154. Id. 
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people.155 
The use of satire as a sanction also has appeared among Tobriand 
Islanders, where the injured party would shout out his accusations and 
derision from within his house, at night, so that all of the villagers 
could hear the charges. The accused one might feel compelled to leave 
the village, unless he was certain of his innocence or rights in the mat-
ter. The shame of being accused even caused some villagers to commit 
suicide.156 
D. Shaming in White Colonial America 
The white colonists of the United States inflicted on wrongdoers a 
host of punishments that bear a striking resemblance to the new sham-
ing tools. In a tum of the century account, 157 A.M. Earle describes 
the colonists as "vastly touchy and resentful about being called oppro-
brious or bantering names; often running petulantly to the court about 
it and seeking redress by prosecution of the offender."158 This ultra-
sensitivity, she remarks, enhanced the effectiveness of the shaming 
sanctions.159 Moreover, the social intimacy of colonial communities 
meant that criminal offenders typically were known members of the 
group, not transient outsiders.160 Thus, the fear of disgrace before the 
community was considerable.161 
One colonial shaming sanction, the admonition, was administered 
as follows: 
Faced with a community member who had committed a serious offense, 
the magistrates or clergymen would lecture him privately to elicit his 
repentance and a resolution to reform. The offender would then be 
brought into open court for a formal admonition by the magistrate, a 
public confession of wrongdoing, and a pronouncement of sentence, 
wholly or partially suspended to symbolize the community's 
forgiveness. 162 
The admonition was a "go and sin no more" lecture, which was fol-
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 176 (relying on work by :Malinowski); see also A. EPSTEIN, THE EXPERIENCE OP 
SHAME IN MELANESIA 12-13 (1984). 
157. A. EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS (1896). 
158. Id. at 1. 
159. Id. at 2. 
160. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Mas-
sachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1223-24 (1982). 
161. At least one historian reports, however, that the humiliatory punishments were rarely 
imposed on social elites. Instead, these offenders were ordered to pay a fine. See E. POWERS, 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MAssACHUSETl'S 195 (1966). 
162. Hirsch, supra note 160, at 1224; see also E. POWERS, supra note 161, at 197, 202-04 
(describing public confessions). 
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lowed by a public apology or confession. The practice has been docu-
mented in seventeenth-century Virginia, where it involved both church 
and state. The offender often was forced to confess publicly to her 
congregation, 163 sometimes dressed in a white cloth, 164 and beg their 
forgiveness. 165 This forgiveness, or redemption, effectively drew the 
offender back into the fold and further reinforced the moral order. 
The forced wearing of signs or letters that listed one's offense also 
occurred throughout the colonies.166 In early Maryland, offenders 
were compelled to stand in the pillory wearing a sign listing their 
crimes.167 Permanent labeling, through branding the offender, was an-
other colonial method of punishing criminals.16s 
The victims of permanent labeling practices in the colonies in-
cluded a vast range of offenders.169 The temporary forms of labeling 
- wearing signs or initials - differed from the permanent labeling of 
branding or maiming in that the former punishment was intended to 
elicit shame but in a reintegrative fashion. Branding and maiming, in 
contrast, were permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out 
of the community, though they did not involve physical banish-
ment.170 Branding and maiming also were designed in part to prevent 
the offender from committing future similar acts, 171 either by warning 
future victims of their criminal propensities or by disabling the 
offender. 
Other colonial forms of humiliation punishment included the 
"bilbo" - a bar of iron with two sliding shackles, like handcuffs, into 
163. A. EARLE, supra note 157, at 20, 35-36. 
164. Id. at 111-13. 
165. One account of punishment methods in Maryland during the late 1600s reports that a 
man "was forced to stand in open court 'with a paper on his breast declaring his offence [sic].' " 
R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 39. In another case, a husband and wife were required to kneel 
before the county justices and ask for forgiveness. The justices in the case explained that they 
required the married couple to kneel before them because the couple had no other way to make 
satisfaction. Id. at 39. 
166. A prominent literary example of the role of such shaming appears in N. HAWTHORNE, 
THE SCARLET LETIER (1850). 
167. R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 32; see also E. POWERS, supra note 161, at 198-201 
(describing signs and symbols of early Massachusetts); Hirsch, supra note 160, at 1226 (describ-
ing wearing of signs as punishment in early Massachusetts). 
168. R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 35. The colonists, however, were not the originators of the 
labeling custom. The practice dates at least from the twelfth century. See A. EARLE, supra note 
157, at 94. 
169. Some Quakers were branded or maimed for practicing their faith. A. EARLE, supra 
note 157, at 138-42. Other offenders who were marked with signs or initials were drunkards, see 
id. at 88, cheats, see id. at 53-54, slanderers, see R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 40, hog stealers, 
murderers, thieves, and runaway slaves, see id. at 35. 
170. Hirsch, supra note 160, at 1228. 
171. Id. 
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which the prisoner's legs were locked. 172 Earle describes the use of the 
bilbo sentence in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, where, for exam-
ple, one "Jams Woodward" was sentenced to be "'sett [sic] in the 
bilbowes for being drunk at Newetowne.' " 173 And, of course, there 
was the pillory, the humiliating character of which was sometimes 
compounded by forcing the offender not only to be sent there, but to 
go with dough on his head174 or with cabbages on his head,175 or with 
other symbols of his particular offense. The crowd then might seal the 
prisoner's mortification by throwing stale eggs at him.116 
The ducking stool, which was used in particular for "scolding wo-
men, "177 the stocks,178 and the pillory all were customary features of 
the colonial county courthouses. Jails were uncommon before the late 
160Qs.179 
The white colonists thus earned their reputation for severity in 
dealing with offenders.180 Puritan culture, especially the belief in the 
doctrine of predestination, may help to explain the seemingly unfeel-
ing tone, and the specific methods, of Puritan punishment.181 The Pu-
ritans understood deviant behavior to be a mark of a person whose 
fixed, evil nature was becoming manifest. Their deep fear of evil and 
desire to reinforce the strict moral order of the community led them to 
emphasize formal public apologies and confessions because they be-
lieved that these public expressions of guilt and remorse would rein-
force the moral order. Moreover, even if the criminal were 
condemned to death, the officials sought her confession before the exe-
172. A. EARLE, supra note 157, at 3-4. 
173. Id. at 5. 
174. Id. at 51 (describing the punishment of a dishonest baker). 
175. Id. (describing the punishment of a person who had stolen cabbages). 
176. Id. at 52. 
177. Id. at 11, 17 (noting that the sentence was designed to "silence idle tongues"). 
178. Id. at 29. The stocks were regarded as low class, so that gentlemen were not sentenced 
to the stocks. The pillory was "aristocratic in comparison •••• " Id. at 35. 
179. R SEMMES, supra note 4, at 34-35. The absence of formal prisons, however, did not 
mean that defendants were never physically confined. For example, Cuthbert Fenwik, "a promi-
nent Maryland colonist," once was confined to a house that became the "prison" of St. Mary's 
County, but was allowed to venture to within one-half mile of the house. Id. at 32. 
Public whippings also were a common form of punishment, and were often shockingly brutal. 
K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 188 (1966). Like the stocks, however, this punishment was 
not inflicted on "gentlemen." R SEMMES, supra note 4, at 38-39; see supra note 178. 
180. Still, punishment elsewhere in the world - then and now - was and is in many ways 
more severe. One commentator speculates that the reason the Puritans' methods nevertheless 
seem exceptionally harsh is that they were delivered in "cold righteousness," with a "relentless 
kind of certainty" that paid scant attention to offender motives, victim grief, community anger or 
any other emotion. K. ERIKSON, supra note 179, at 189. Erikson reasons that Puritan justice 
had a "flat, mechanical tone because it dealt with the laws of nature rather than the decisions of 
men." Id. 
181. See id. at 194-95. 
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cution. The condemned person in effect would stand aside from her 
own life and misdeeds, pronounce them the work of the devil, and 
join, figuratively speaking, the crowd that affirmed the correctness of 
her execution.182 This cooperation in, or "consent" to, the penalty 
may have relieved somewhat the Puritans' underlying discomfort, 
however buried, in punishing an offender whose sins were believed to 
be beyond her power to prevent. 
Puritans' indoctrination into the will of God and the laws of na-
ture, as the Puritans perceived them, began in childhood.183 During 
the early months of life, the infant was treated indulgently. Shortly 
thereafter, a radical shift occurred toward a harsh, disciplined life.184 
The object was to curb or beat down the child's wilfulness as soon as 
possible in a direct confrontation with "original sin."185 The effect, in 
psychological terms, was to deprive the child of a confident sense of 
autonomy.186 As psychologists have observed, "the reverse of auton-
omy is the distress created by deep inner trends of shame and 
doubt."187 Thus, the Puritan child became an adult who was ex-
tremely sensitive to public exposure and shame.188 
The Puritan punishment practices, like those of the Japanese and 
other cultures already described, demonstrate the connection between 
a community's normative structure and the nature and effectiveness of 
legal sanctions. The colonial shaming practices can only be under-
stood in light of the community's religious beliefs, childrearing tech-
niques, and other culture-specific features. Like the Japanese, the 
Eskimo tribes, and the Tobriand Islanders, the white colonists lived in 
intimate, closely bound, and normatively cohesive communities, 
within which shaming could and did play a signal role in reinforcing 
standards of behavior. 
182. Id. at 195 (''The victim [was] asked to endorse the action of the court and to share in the 
judgment against him, to move back into the community as a witness to his own execution."); see 
also supra text accompanying note 55. This emphasis on cooperation by the criminal was not 
unique to the Puritans. During the 1700s in Amsterdam, the authorities likewise encouraged 
penitence of criminals, such that "[t]he execution of a disbeliever was not a perfect one." P. 
SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at 59. 
183. See, e.g., Demos, Developmental Perspectives on the History of Childhood, 2 J. INTERDIS-
CIPLINARY. HlsT. 315, 320-21 (1971). 
184. Id. at 321. 
185. Id. at 320-21. 
186. Id. at 321. 
187. Id. at 323. 
188. Id. at 324. The Puritans' sensitivity to public shame is reflected in the large number of 
defamation actions they filed, as well as in the range ofhumiliatory punishments they employed. 
Id. at 325. 
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E. Conclusion 
The effectiveness of shaming sanctions, whether formal or infor-
mal, hinges on a variety of cultural conditions. Informal sanctions 
appear to work best within relatively bounded, close-knit communi-
ties, whose members "don't mind their own business" and who rely on 
each other.1s9 These cultures have widely shared moral or behavioral 
expectations of their citizens, which are publicly expressed.19° High 
expectations of social responsibility, coupled with close social bonding, 
a deemphasis of personal autonomy, and strong family attachment, 
produce conditions that are conducive to reintegrative shaming.191 Ef-
fective shaming also entails a strong identification between the shamed 
offender and other members of the community.192 
These cultural factors help to explain why shaming as a form of 
social control occurs more often within small societies that are charac-
terized by intimate face-to-face associations, interdependence, and co-
operation.193 Close relations of this type often are missing from 
modem urban settings.194 The gravity of humiliatory punishments to 
an individual also will hinge on her relative power and resources. If 
she must depend greatly on the group for social, economic, or political 
support, or cannot leave the group easily, then a social sanction will 
have a tremendous impact.195 Thus, those people who are most likely 
to defy social norms and risk shaming sanctions, even within close-
knit societies, are the very rich and the very poor. The rich can afford 
to defy the norms because they are insulated by their wealth. The 
189. J. BRAl11IWAITE, supra note 99, at 8. 
190. Id. at 10; see also Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case 
Study of Two Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L.J. 471, 483 (1954). 
191. J. BRAl11IWAITE, supra note 99, at 30. 
192. Schwartz, supra note 190, at 483. 
193. Id. at 477 (quoting c. CooLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 23 (1909)); see also Merry, 
Rethinking Gossip and Scandal in 1 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CoNTROL: 
FuNDAMENTALS 271, (D. Black ed. 1984). 
194. When, however, urban conditions create tight-knit social pockets or neighborhoods 
with equivalent "economic and social interdependence and barriers to mobility outside the com· 
munity," then informal social sanctions in the form of gossip may be powerful curbs on social 
behavior. See Merry, supra note 193, at 289-90. The potential adverse consequences of shaming 
within these pockets are the same as in other small-scale societies, including ostracism, shunning, 
ridicule, and banishment. Id. at 284-86. 
195. Id. at 282, 286; see also Grimes & Turk, Labeling in Context, in CRIME, LAW, AND 
SANCTIONS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 34, 55 (M. Krohn & R. Akers eds. 1978) (noting that 
"[t]he effect of labeling upon self-definition depends upon the relative power of each involved 
individual, as each impinges upon the others in the course of the highly personal enterprise of 
self-definition"); cf. Jensen & Erickson, The Social Meaning of Sanctions, in id. at 119, 133 (con· 
cluding that "those subjects who attribute stigmatic consequences to official labels are least likely 
to engage in behavior which is liable to labeling. Those most likely to deviate are those for whom 
official labeling may be socially meaningless."). 
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poor may defy the norms simply because they cannot afford to con-
form, and because they have less "social standing" to lose. 196 
The final factor that seems to contribute to effective shaming is the 
culture's capacity and instinct for reinforcement of socially co"ect be-
havior. In intimate societies, the organs of authority often deliver both 
praise and rebuke. They also have established rituals for reclaiming 
the shamed one, should she prove herself worthy. 
VI. APPLICATION 
A. Introduction 
In the following sections, I apply the foregoing psychological and 
anthropological materials to modem American criminal law enforce-
ment, and speculate about whether shaming is likely to yield positive 
social benefits. I focus in particular on whether shaming will deter 
crime, insofar as I regard this as the main objective of those who favor 
shame sanctions. 
First, I raise doubts about a court's ability to identify the individ-
ual meaning of shame, as is necessary to effect specific deterrence or 
rehabilitation ends. The complex nature of shame, and the practical 
limitations on a judge's time and inclination to make accurate estima-
tions about an offender's ego ideal, suggest that customized shame 
sanctions are an impractical objective. 
Second, I note that in most criminal court contexts, especially 
those in large urban centers, the cultural conditions of effective, hu-
mane shaming seem absent. Unlike the intimate face-to-face cultures 
that rely heavily on shaming, cities in the United States typically are 
not characterized by high interdependence among citizens, strong 
norm cohesiveness, or robust communitarianism. Moreover, the pri-
mary conditions to effective shaming - audience awareness and par-
ticipation, a cohesive body of would-be offenders who perceive and are 
sensitive to the same shame, judicial personnel and procedures that 
can tailor sanctions to the target audience sensitivities, and a formal 
means of reinte,grating shamed offenders - seem only weakly present 
in these settings. This suggests that even sanctions that are intended 
to exploit a community-specific, versus offender-specific, definition of 
shame likewise are unlikely to effect significant deterrence. 
Third, I list several institutional, administrative, and other practi-
cal problems with shaming that may make it unworkable. Fourth, I 
invoke the historical decline of shaming as a warning against its revi-
196. Merry, supra note 193, at 283-84. 
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val. Finally, I describe a context in which many people imagine that 
shaming would prove exceptionally effective - middle-class crime. I 
suggest that even as applied to this status sensitive population, sham-
ing may not add measurably to the deterrence value of existing 
sanctions. 
These conclusions are subject to an obvious and important caveat. 
No empirical work currently is available with which to test the practi-
cal impact of shaming sanctions. What follow, therefore, are provi-
sional hypotheses. 
B. Shaming and Offender-Specific Factors 
The signal insight from the psychological studies of shame is that 
the experience is personal. People are reared differently and exposed 
to different peer relationships and other personality shaping influences; 
as such, they experience shame differently.197 Psychologists offer gen-
eral statements about one's ego ideal, but these merely describe how 
life experiences tend to shape the ego ideal, rather than what, pre-
cisely, those events include. For example, they believe shame hinges 
on the extent to which a person has a confident sense of her autonomy. 
They do not know, however, how to assure this confidence or how to 
ascertain which adults lack this training and hence are exceptionally 
prone to shame. For a judge in a criminal case to take into account 
the multiple, individual meanings of shame thus would be difficult 
indeed.198 
A second, practical implication of the psychological work on 
shame likewise suggests that shaming may not have impressive specific 
deterrence or rehabilitative effects. The people who are most vulnera-
ble to shaming are the ones who are most strongly socialized. 199 This 
means that the people most likely to respond to public shaming sanc-
tions are nonoffender members of the audience, not potential offend-
ers. An offender has demonstrated her imperviousness to the relative 
cost of public shaming by committing the act in question. Unless she 
is the first person to suffer the public humiliation, or otherwise has no 
warning that her actions might trigger public shame, she apparently 
was not deterred, for whatever reasons, by the prospect of shaming. 
Of course, she may have imagined, unreasonably or not, that she 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 94-108. 
198. See infra Part VII. 
199. See supra text accompanying note 103; cf. Jensen & Erickson, supra note 195, at 133. 
Lawrence Friedman once ironically remarked that, "Criminals, it was commonly observed, did 
not blush." L. FRIEDMAN, A HlsrORY OF AMERICAN LAW 601 (2d ed. 1985). In fact, however, 
psychological studies on shame suggest otherwise, though offenders may blush at different things 
than nonoll'enders. 
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would evade detection. In any event, the threat of a possible convic-
tion and shaming best deters the people who most fear social disap-
proval, who usually are not offenders.200 
On the contrary, public degradation ceremonies may reduce inhibi-
tions that tend to cabin criminal instincts, according to some theorists. 
The anticipated effect of public shaming is a downward change in sta-
tus, coupled with symbolic and actual shunning of the offender by 
others.201 Indeed, this shunning of convicted offenders may' occur 
even when public officials try to contain it.202 Once the offender's sta-
tus is changed, though, she may have a reduced incentive to avoid the 
behaviors that triggered the demotion.203 This is especially true when, 
as is the case in modem American criminal courts, there is no public 
ritual, ceremony, or other procedure for reestablishing or regaining the 
lost status. Modem shaming, like modem punishment in general, is 
not "reintegrative." The stigmatized offender thus may "drift" toward 
subcultures that are more accepting of her particular norm viola-
tions. 204 Association with the subculture in tum may facilitate future 
crime, especially for crimes that require multiple actors or hard-to-
obtain materials, tools, or connections. 
Labeling theorists believe that these potential negative conse-
quences of stigmatizing offenders outweigh any benefits. Specifically, 
they argue that by labeling an offender "deviant" - which shaming 
sanctions clearly try to do - the state may produce "secondary devi-
ance," or criminal acts that are a result of the labeling.205 Critics of 
200. See Jensen & Erickson, supra note 195, at 133. The authors conclude that 
those subjects who attribute stigmatic consequences to official labels are least likely to en-
gage in behavior which is liable to labeling. Those most likely to deviate are those for whom 
official labeling may be socially meaningless. Thus, those most likely to be labeled may be 
the least likely to be affected by labeling. • • • To understand the variable consequences of 
labeling requires an understanding of the social meaning of sanctions. 
Id. 
201. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 191; J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, 
at 60. 
202. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 191. 
203. Id. at 193. If, however, the stigmatized offender cannot locate or gain the acceptance of 
a subculture that tolerates her stigma, then she may adopt a life of solitary deviance, or try to 
regain admission into the dominant culture. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 68. For some 
crimes, such as drug offenses, solitary deviance may be impossible. A drug offender needs, at the 
least, a supplier or a buyer. Id. at 67. 
204. See D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr (1964). 
205. See generally R. TROJANOWICZ & M. MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CoNCEPTS 
AND CoNTROL 59-61 (4th ed. 1987); Gove, The Labelling Perspective: An Overview, in THE 
LABELLING OF DEVIANCE 9 (W. Gove 2d ed. 1980); Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon 
Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the Evidence, 8 LAW & SocY. REv. 583, 584-
85 (1974); see also J. FREEDMAN & A. DOOB, DEVIANCY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING DIF-
FERENT (1968) (describing influence on experimental groups of public disclosure of their "devi-
ance" from "average" scores on a "personality" test. Those identified as deviants first sought to 
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labeling theory, such as Walter Gove, quite sensibly have responded 
that no empirical data prove that the secondary deviance is a result of 
the labeling, versus whatever conditions or instincts prompted the pri-
mary offense.206 These critics further maintain that good results can 
flow from labeling, such as isolating the offender and thereby prevent-
ing corruption of others (incapacitation), deterring other potential 
deviants (general deterrence), forcing the offender out of a criminal 
lifestyle, and, perhaps, channeling her toward appropriate rehabilita-
tive services (specific deterrence and rehabilitation).201 
The strength of these last claims I will address below. The evi-
dence on the first claim, that labeling or stigmatizing an offender may 
increase the chances of subsequent delinquent behavior, is inconclu-
sive. The most accurate statement is that we do not know, for certain, 
whether labeling produces secondary deviance. If the labeling theo-
rists are correct, however, then shaming not only may not promote 
specific deterrence or rehabilitative ends, it may defeat them. More-
over, the more effective the shaming, the more counterproductive it 
may become. The judge thus would need to predict both the of-
fender's individual susceptibility to shame and her likely post-shaming 
behavior. Each factor in turn might vary with the nature of the of-
fense, the nature of the shaming sanction, and pre- and post-convic-
tion environmental, and other offender-specific conditions. With some 
crimes, there is little doubt that some offenders feel sincere shame, but 
do not stop their behavior. Some spouse abusers, for example, may 
experience acute remorse after a beating episode, yet repeat the 
beatings. 208 
A final implication of the psychological aspects of shame, which 
raises both practical and fairness concerns, is the nature of the wound 
that shaming seeks to inflict. When it works, it redefines a person in a 
negative, often irreversible, way. Effective shame sanctions strike at 
an offender's psychological core. To allow government officials to 
search for and manipulate this vulnerable core is worrisome, to say the 
least. Moreover, nothing in the psychological materials on shame, or 
in the available literature on the stigmatic aspect of punishment, indi-
conceal their deviancy. Once it was disclosed, however, they chose to associate with other "devi-
ant" subjects). 
206. Gove, supra note 205, at 13-15 (collecting empirical work); see also Mahoney, supra 
note 205, at 588-89; Wellford, Labeling Theory and Criminology: An Assessment, 22 Soc. PRODS. 
332 (1975). 
207. Gove, supra note 205, at 18. 
208. See, e.g., L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 65-66 (1979). But see J. FLEMING, 
STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 289 (1979) (noting that not all men express regret after a beating 
episode). 
June 1991] Shame 1921 
cates that a judge or any other person can reconstruct that core after 
the defendant has "done her time" in the "public stocks." Certainly, 
nothing in contemporary criminal punishment practices suggests that 
judges have adopted procedures for rebuilding this core. 
C. Shaming and Modem Cultural Patterns 
Anthropological and historical materials are especially pertinent to 
estimations of the general deterrence effects of shunning and shame. 
The signal insight of these materials is that for shaming to be an effec-
tive method of controlling community behavior, the community in 
question must be receptive to these methods. This receptivity depends 
on whether the community satisfies the several cultural and institu-
tional conditions that have been identified as characteristics of so-
called shame cultures. 
The cultural conditions of effective shaming seem weakly present, 
at best, in many contemporary American cities. Indeed, shaming 
sanctions run counter to the pattern of existing methods of norm en-
forcement in the United States. First, most law enforcement is con-
ducted outside of public view. Private security officers, employers, or 
other nonpublic agents play a significant, nonpublic role in norm en-
forcement.209 Even when public agents do enforce punishment, how-
ever, it rarely comes to the attention of the rest of the community in 
any systematic, high-profile manner.210 Millions of people are arrested 
and convicted each year, but only a handful excite significant national 
or local interest or attention. 
Formal shaming thus would constitute a significant change in law 
enforcement: it would attempt to bring to public attention a wide 
spectrum of criminal case dispositions. This shift, however, would re-
quire a dramatic restructuring of existing practice and procedure and 
a reversal of the strong trend toward privatization of criminal punish-
ment. The question is whether such a reversal is likely to produce 
substantial public benefits. 
The most thoughtful argument in favor of deprivatizing criminal 
law has come from John Braithwaite. Braithwaite insists that public 
shaming would improve the effectiveness of criminal law enforcement 
because it would help to create a shared, moral conception of order. 
209. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 60-61. 
210. In fact, most criminal cases do not reach the trial stage. The overwhelming majority are 
plea bargained and thus escape public scrutiny. See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's 
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, 
76 CoLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Vorenburg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. 
L. REv. 1521 (1981). 
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He maintains that the "uncoupling" of shame and punishment in the 
United States has been a mistake that partly explains our rising crime 
rates, as compared to the low crime rates of Japan.211 He argues, 
therefore, that we should reestablish the cultural tradition of shaming 
wrongdoers, and explicitly link shame and punishment. That is, 
shaming not only can work, it is an essential aspect of a sound and 
effective legal order and thus must be revived in the United States. 
The main problem with Braithwaite's suggestion, however, and 
with the contemporary revival of shaming sanctions, is that our tradi-
tion of shaming cannot be "reestablished" if the cultural conditions to 
this tradition have eroded. Population increases and geographical ex-
panse confound such efforts in the United States, and may help to 
explain why Japan, as well as certain island or tribal cultures, have 
continued to couple shame and punishment more effectively than the 
United States has. 
Other factors likewise play a role, and point against the likelihood 
that shaming will deter offenders in most contemporary American set-
tings. First, the United States as a nation is not known for the highly 
developed sense of social interdependency that characterizes the Japa-
nese212 and that appears to be an integral condition of effective 
shaming. 
Second, the official agents of norm enforcement often are viewed 
with suspicion or hostility. Most people in the United States, espe-
cially those in large urban centers, do not see police officers or judges 
as members of their "family,"213 or otherwise part of a benign network 
of interconnected social actors. Impersonal, authoritarian, and de-
tached law enforcement agents likely cannot easily substitute for the 
collaborative, private, interdependent networks of social control that 
tend to exist in small societies, or in morally cohesive larger societies. 
Moreover, the social unit that is mainly responsible for inculcating 
cultural shame values, the family, often is missing, culturally isolated, 
or dysfunctional. 
A third significant distinction between the United States and most 
shame cultures is its cultural complexity. A federal or state judge's 
jurisdiction typically extends over several subcultures, even when the 
geographical region is relatively small. These subcultural variations 
can give rise to different definitions of shame, which may confound 
official efforts to deter crime through shaming. 
211. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 61. 
212. Id. at 62, 84 (emphasizing the highly developed communitarianism in Japanese society). 
213. Id. at 62-63 (contrasting the Japanese view of authority with the North American view). 
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This is not to say, however, that Americans have no commonly 
shared instincts about crime or about shame. A majority of Ameri-
cans likely agree that most of the acts we now call crimes should be. 214 
For example, few American subcultures condone murder, child abuse, 
or theft, though some may tolerate deviant acts more readily than 
others,215 and may construe differently the adequate justifications or 
mitigating factors for these crimes. Likewise, some fairly large subcul-
tures likely exist whose members are in substantial agreement about 
certain aspects of right and wrong. Nevertheless, American subcul-
turalism, or cultural pluralism, is pronounced enough to make broad 
conclusions about our moral coherence suspect, and thus to under-
mine the likely effectiveness of widespread government attempts to 
shame offenders, absent significant decentralization of criminal law au-
thority and the delivery of formal norm enforcement power to the lo-
cal subcultures. 
A fourth and more considerable obstacle to effective shaming is 
that, even where general cultural agreement exists about what acts are 
wrong, significant subcultural disagreements often exist regarding 
what punishments are embarrassing. For example, juvenile delinquent 
subcultures, according to some writers, place excessive emphasis on 
masculinity and membership.216 Consequently, a prison sentence is 
not necessarily an embarrassment to subculture members. On the 
contrary, it actually can elevate a member's status within the subcul-
ture. 217 Thus, for a shaming sanction to deter offenses by juvenile 
gang members, it must undermine the defendant's masculinity or com-
promise his gang membership, and trigger shunning by the gang. To 
deter other subcultures from committing the same offenses may re-
quire quite different forms of shaming. Subcultural meanings of status 
therefore influence the social meaning and general deterrence effect of 
sanctions, especially for crimes that tend to be committed only or 
mainly by that subculture. This means that a judge or other sentenc-
ing body must know what sanctions will improve an offender's status 
position within her subculture(s), and what sanctions will harm it.218 
The judge also must anticipate the strategies that people will use to 
214. Id. at 39 (noting that "extreme versions of subculturalism which posit wholesale rejec-
tion of the criminal law by substantial sections of the community simply do not wash"). 
215. Id. at 66. 
216. See, e.g., D. MATZA, supra note 204, at 53, 156-59. 
217. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 216. Zimring and Hawkins quote 
research interviews of gang members who claim that a member who has been in jail receives 
greater respect from other members because of his prison experience. Id. 
218. Cf. Probert, Creative Judicial Sanctioning: Application in the Law of Torts, 49 IOWA L. 
REV. 277, 286-87 (1964) (discussing the use of alternative sanctioning in civil cases). 
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avoid being deprived of that status position.219 
An ability to predict these subcultural responses will hinge, in part, 
on the extent to which the judge is connected, whether by actual or 
vicarious experience, to these subcultural pattems.220 This will de-
pend upon the specific crime and the individual judge, among other 
things. In general, however, the judicial selection process tends to 
screen out candidates with actual experience in the criminal subcul-
ture, though they may acquire vicarious experience through their for-
mal or informal education, experience on the bench, and other avenues 
to this type of awareness. Absent other information to assist them, 
many judges likely project their own, subcultural (predominantly 
white, middle-class) estimations of shame onto the offenders, rather 
than developing multiple subcultural meanings of shame. As such, 
unless we adopt different procedures for selecting and training profes-
sional judges, rely more heavily on juries of offender-group "peers," or 
invent alternative means of evaluating varying subcultural meanings of 
shame, then the shaming sanctions that sitting criminal court judges 
invent may not deter much (subculture) crime. None of these steps, 
however, has accompanied the new shaming penalties. 
Finally, the anthropological studies further suggest that the effec-
tiveness of shaming as a method of norm enforcement depends partly 
on whether a culture shames reintegratively. If the community has 
rituals to redeem and reclaim the chastened offender afterwards, and 
shaming is based in part on optimism about her responsiveness to this 
grooming, then the shaming is reintegrative. The earmarks of reinte-
grative shame cultures include social cohesiveness, a strong family sys-
tem, high communitarianism, and social control mechanisms that aim 
to control by reintegration into the cohesive networks, rather than by 
formal restraint.221 
These conditions, however, are not currently dominant in the 
United States.222 Our legal institutions and national personality tend 
to reflect the dominant American philosophical emphasis on individu-
ality, independence, and autonomy, rather than on interdependence, 
community, or shared values. Liberal values are significantly more 
pronounced in American legal culture than in any of the cultures that 
rely most effectively and notoriously on shame sanctions. For exam-
ple, the Japanese concepts of shame to one's name and "honor," as 
defined by fulfillment of social roles, fit awkwardly at best into prevail-
219. Id. at 286. 
220. Id. at 287. 
221. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 84-85. 
222. Id. at 86. 
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ing American visions of individual personality and self-reliance. A.J?. 
such, the notion that the government in criminal cases not only should 
exploit cultural definitions of shame, but should attempt to forge these 
definitions, would offend many Americans. Again, this strong aver-
sion to government encroachment on individual autonomy is not our 
only national tradition, nor is it the dominant one within all American 
subcultures. Competing and supplemental traditions, such as the 
community-oriented traditions of North American Indian tribes, 
clearly exist and challenge the dominant cultural stress on "individual-
ity." Nevertheless, the national, state and even most local cultures 
lack a profound sense of mutual obligation and community.223 
Braithwaite acknowledges this relative absence of optimal cultural 
conditions for shaming in the United States. He nevertheless believes 
that even in highly individualistic cultures such as the United States, 
shaming still will reduce crime more effectively than punishment that 
is unaccompanied by moralizing and denunciation.224 But 
Braithwaite's theory is based entirely on conditions that he admits are 
not met in the dominant, contemporary American culture. To take 
one striking example, he observes that "the way we respond to devi-
ance, particularly crime, in the West, gives free play to degradation 
ceremonies of both a formal and informal kind to certify deviance, 
while providing almost no place in the culture for ceremonies to decer-
tify deviance."225 Despite this important admission, he adheres to his 
optimistic vision of the favorable possibilities of devising shame cere-
monies that are "reintegrative,'' not disintegrative. Moreover, his op-
timism extends to the favorable possibilities of significant revisions of 
ideology; he rejects a strong embrace of individualism as too dated and 
outmoded.226 He would direct the focus of norm enforcement away 
from the state, and toward alternative, intermediate communities of 
interest - such as the workplace, schools, or other association 
223. Id. (noting that most Western societies are characterized more by individualism than 
comm unitarianism). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 163. A more optimistic account of our criminal law process is that of James Boyd 
White, who describes the criminal law as a system of meaning in which we "blame" the defend-
ant and thereby preserve her dignity and our communal claims as well. White sees this system of 
meaning as one that, even when the defendant is punished, still recognizes her as a member of the 
community. J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW 209 (1985). This forgiving notion of blaming corresponds with Braithwaite's "reintegra-
tive" concept of shaming. As a normative account of just punishment, I find it attractive. As a 
descriptive account of modem criminal law, I am unpersuaded. Robert Cover's account seems 
more compelling. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (conclud-
ing that "[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death"). 
226. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 169-70. 
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contexts.227 
This is a comprehensive and utopian agenda indeed, the fulfillment 
of which might well enhance the favorable possibilities of effective 
shaming sanctions. But it demands root-down readjustment of the 
dominant contemporary consciousness about personal responsibility 
for crime control and norm observation. Short of such a profound 
ideological shift, coupled with significant structural and procedural 
changes to facilitate that shift, our modem state-imposed shame sanc-
tions will lack the cultural foundations that Braithwaite himself deems 
essential. 
Any theory of crime control that anticipates community participa-
tion in law enforcement cannot work without at least some current 
community receptiveness. A proposal such as Braithwaite's "reinte-
grative shaming" proposal, .which includes a shift away from state-
enforced norms, clearly demands community responsiveness and ac-
countability. The question thus is whether the community as it now 
stands would respond favorably to his initiative. 
One reason to be skeptical of Braithwaite's theory is suggested by 
our unsuccessful experiences with rehabilitation theory and with com-
munity-based reform efforts. Rehabilitation theory experienced a de-
cline because, inter alia, the social conditions for this theory 
disappeared. For the rehabilitation approach to punishment to work, 
the community must have both a "strong ... belief in the malleability 
of human character and behavior," and a "working agreement on 
what it means to be rehabilitated."228 Nineteenth-century America ar-
guably satisfied both conditions, and also was marked by a high regard 
for the family. Thus, the ideal family became the model for the reha-
bilitative ideal, and the sanctions imposed by juvenile courts attempted 
to match those of a wise parent in a family setting.229 When this confi-
dence in the family and consensus about rehabilitation ended, and op-
timism about human malleability eroded, so did confidence in the 
rehabilitative ideal.230 
This demise of rehabilitation theory demonstrates the link between 
a community's beliefs about criminal behavior and the cultural mean-
ing of its punishment methods. Many people today view criminals as 
227. Id. at 172-73. Braithwaite remarks that a shift to communitarianism eventually may 
occur because it would serve the interests of American capital. Id. at 174. 
228. F. ALLEN, supra note 69, at 11. 
229. Id. at 15. 
230. Id. at 18-31; see also Sarat, Beyond Rehabilitation, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: IS-
SUES IN CRIMINAL JurncE, supra note 63, at 103, 107-12 (describing complex hoot of changes in 
philosophy, political climate, and social sciences that contributed to the rise and fall of the reha-
bilitative ideal). 
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irredeemably "pathological" individuals in need of intolerably high 
levels of behavioral or psychological modification or of absolute con-
tainment, not as errant fellow group members who might, through 
post-act shaming and public opportunities to apologize, be reclaimed 
and reintegrated. Given this attitude toward criminals, modem sham-
ing in the United States conveys a different and less benevolent mean-
ing than it possesses in cultures that believe in the defendant's 
redemption and rehabilitation potential. Even the Puritans, with their 
severe methods of exploiting social embarrassment to curb crime, ac-
ted in part out of concern for the offender's soul. Modem-day sham-
ing, in contrast, lacks this arguably benign motive and social meaning. 
The importance of existing, cultural realities to effective punish-
ment methods - especially those that would shift norm enforcement 
duties to the community - also is underscored by emerging evidence 
that the community-based reform movement too has failed. Commu-
nity-based reform advocates maintain that centralization and bureau-
cracy of law enforcement undermine the effectiveness and humaneness 
of legal responses to crime, and that community-based alternatives to 
state-managed institutionalization are more humane, less isolating, 
and more economical.231 They often add that the community alterna-
tives "could not be worse" than conventional corrections methods, es-
pecially prison, and so should be "given a chance."232 
The actual results of these alternatives, however, are discouraging. 
Instead of reducing state intervention, community-based reform seems 
to expand authority and increase social control. 233 The location and 
agency of the control may change, but not the level or its essential 
nature. Moreover, unmonitored discretion with its potential for une-
qual punishment is more commonplace under these programs than 
under conventional state-managed programs.234 
One reason for the poor results of community-based reform lies in 
its reliance on rhetoric and a romantic view of the community alterna-
tives to traditional state-enforced punishment, rather than on a realis-
tic and thorough appraisal of the complex nature of a shift from a 
public to private system of social control. Contrary to the reformers' 
assumptions, the delivery of social control to community-based agen-
cies does not necessarily mean less pervasive, more benign, or more 
effective control. Rather, these nontraditional, community-based in-
231. See, e.g., Lewis & Darling, The Idea of Community in Correctional Reform: How Rheto-
ric and Reality Join, in ARE PRISONS ANY BETIER? 95, 96-98 (J. Murphy & J. Dison eds. 1990). 
232. Id. at 97-98. 
233. Id. at 99. 
234. Id. at 102. 
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stitutions often reproduce or even exacerbate some of the perceived 
shortcomings of state-managed institutions. The ongoing community-
based reform movement has faltered in part because the existing com-
munity conditions do not match the reformers' assumptions about the 
community's structure, behavior, values, and beliefs. 
The message for shame sanction reformers is clear. If shaming in-
novations likewise are premised on inflated, ethnocentric, or otherwise 
inaccurate estimations of likely community responsiveness to public 
punishments, then they cannot produce the favorable outcomes that 
these reformers claim will occur. As I have argued, and as these past 
experiences with penal reform reinforce, punishment has culture-de-
pendent meaning and effectiveness. Reform thus requires sophisti-
cated and realistic assessment of the present culture or cultures that 
law seeks to control or influence.235 
In sum, the anthropological materials suggest that for shaming to 
be an effective and humane punishment technique, the culture must 
match reformers' expectations. If reintegrative shaming is the goal, as 
it is under Braithwaite's model, then the existing culture must be char-
acterized by social interconnection, mutual dependency, and social co-
hesion. If the culture lacks these qualities, as our dominant culture 
seems to, then shaming may prove as counterproductive and harsh as 
spanking a child does in a family governed by authoritarianism, non-
nurturance, and impersonal control. 
235. Contextual analyses of disciplinary techniques in childrearing further support this 
claim. Different families often establish different systems of meaning and rules, in the way that 
different cultures tend to do. Studies of family patterns and discipline thus may be of interest to 
penologists. Some of these studies indicate that punitive discipline in some families promotes 
aggressive behavior in children. But these childrearing studies show inconsistent results, which 
one author has explained as follows: 
[T)he effect of punitive practices appears to be related to the severity of the practices and to 
the childrearing context in which it is embedded. For example, Baumrind (1971, 1986) 
reported that parents who provided a nurturant, responsive child-rearing environment, yet 
maintained high standards and occasionally used power-assertive techniques, tended to rear 
socially responsible boys (their girls were neither high nor low in social responsibility). 
However, when parental demands were enforced in a punitive, authoritarian context, boys 
exhibited relatively low levels of socially responsive behavior. Similarly, Roe (1980) found 
that children's prosocial and caring behaviors toward others appeared to be unaffected by 
their mothers' use of physical punishment if punishment occurred in the context of an over-
all positive relationship. With regard to aggressiveness, high levels of children's aggression 
have been positively associated with more severe parental punitiveness such as, for example, 
parental abuse of their children (George & Main, 1979; see Parke & Slaby, 1983). Thus, it is 
likely that severe punitive practices, especially when embedded in a nonsupportive environ-
ment, enhance the probability of children exhibiting aggressive patterns of behavior. 
Eisenberg, The Development of Prosocia/ and Aggressive Behavior, in DEVELOPMENTAL PSY-
CHOLOGY: AN ADVANCED TEXTBOOK 461, 476 (M. Bornstein & M. Lamb 2d ed. 1988). Strict-
ness, or sharp punitive practices, thus can be a proper punishment technique, if administered in 
an appropriate family or "cultural" context. 
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D. Historical Insights 
The historical rise and fall of public shaming in the United States 
and Western Europe lends further support to the view that the revival 
of shaming is a wrong tum. Penal practices within the United States 
moved away from public spectacles toward incarceration during the 
nineteenth century.236 One reason for the shift was that people came 
to believe that these punishments not only were debasing; they also did 
not check crime. 237 Another factor that led to abolition of these prac-
tices was a shift in attitudes toward rehabilitation as a proper and at-
tainable goal of punishment, and toward the view that offenders would 
profit from being confined and required to perform useful work, ex-
acted in proportion to their crime.238 That is, both practical and hu-
manistic impulses animated the rise of the penitentiary and the 
movement away from the humiliatory and sanguinary punishments of 
the early colonial period. 
Public punishments likewise declined in Europe during the same 
period. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, public spec-
tacles had served to preserve shaky state authority,239 insofar as state 
power was not yet taken for granted. 240 Spectacle helped to reinforce 
this power, in part because it was regarded as such harsh punish-
ment;241 indeed, it was viewed as graver than physical confinement.242 
A combination of post-Enlightenment intellectual and social devel-
opments in Western Europe cast doubt on the spectacle aspect ofpun-
ishment,243 however, and contributed to its abolition. The rise of 
confinement as an option, 244 along with the rise of the nation-state, 
reduced the perceived necessity for public executions.245 More effec-
tive, stable, and impersonal regimes led to more impersonal forms of 
repression.246 As public order became relatively well secured, authori-
ties needed less exemplary and harsh punishment as proof of their 
power. These social developments produced an environment in which 
236. See 0. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CusroMS, 
1776-184S, 9 (1922). 
237. Id. at 9-10. 
238. B. MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS 3 (1936). 
239. P. SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at SS. 
240. See id. at 201. 
241. See id. at 66. 
242. Id. at 66-67. 
243. Id. at 183. 
244. Id.; see also M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 104-
31 (A. Sheridan trans. 1977). 
24S. P. SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at 20S. 
246. Id. 
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the post-Enlightenment appeals to abandon these painful spectacles fi-
nally could prevail. Similar intellectual and social developments like-
wise prompted changes in the United States. In 1835, the State of 
New York discontinued public hangings and the rest of the states soon 
followed its example. 247 
These historical accounts offer several messages for modem re-
formers. First, they suggest the limited deterrence value of shame 
sanctions in that these shaming measures, though much harsher than 
the modem shaming innovations, nevertheless failed to discourage of-
fenders. Moreover, these failures occurred under conditions more 
favorable to public shame methods than modem cultural conditions. 
A second insight of the historical materials is that people have long 
regarded public punishments as exceptionally painful. This does not 
prove that they in fact are worse than private punishments, but it lends 
the force of traditional estimations of cruelty to claims that they are 
inhumane, and that the public may recoil at their widespread use. 
The third insight of the historical materials is that resort to public 
punishments often is a sign of flagging institutional or governmental 
self-confidence. Disciplinary authorities who invoke public sanctions 
betray insecurity about their power, and about general obedience to 
their moral authority. Like the weak and ineffective teacher who 
forces misbehaving students to stand in the comer, wear dunce caps, 
or endure other humiliatory measures, the government that resorts to 
public shame measures may reveal itself to be an ineffective, even des-
perate, authority. That is, the modem revival of shaming may be a 
symptom of impotence in our formal institutions of social control. 
But, if history is a guide, it suggests that a revival of formalized sham-
ing is not a sound means of rebuilding that authority. 
E. Institutional Constraints and Other Practical Concerns 
Finally, even if the foregoing objections to shaming could be over-
come, the sanction might still prove impractical for several reasons. 
First, if the penalty were to become a common sanction, it may pro-
duce a shaming overload, which could reduce public interest in these 
displays and thereby lessen the deterrence impact. This decline in 
public interest could prove expensive to monitor. At least three mil-
lion people pass through the state and federal corrections systems each 
year.248 Approximately two thirds of the offenders who are under cor-
247. G. Scorr, supra note 82, at 58. 
248. See R. CARTER, R. McGEE & E. NELSON, CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 1 (1975). The 
current figures likely are much higher than these 1975 figures reflect. 
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rectional supervision are on probation or parole, and thus have been 
returned to the community.249 If only one half of this two thirds was 
sentenced to shame sanctions, this still might involve one million 
shamings per year for the government to publish and for the public to 
consume. 
Daily announcements of criminal incidents, which appear in many 
local newspapers, thus would expand considerably. At first glance, 
though, this may seem a workable and relatively inexpensive alterna-
tive to prison, despite the high number of shamings. Government 
might exploit television, radio, newspapers, billboards, as well as other 
communication vehicles to announce criminal conduct. All of these 
methods - except perhaps televised shaming - probably would cost 
far less than incarceration, supervised probation, or rehabilitative 
therapy. 
These penalties would soon be ignored, however. The main reason 
that most of the modem shaming sanctions described in this Article 
have garnered media attention is that they are curiosities, and hence 
newsworthy. This interest surely would wane if shaming became com-
monplace. That is, shaming is an inherently short-fused sanction. 
The primary problem with a dramatic increase in the number of 
shamings thus would not be the initial cost of implementing or moni-
toring shaming punishments, but the practical problem of how to mea-
sure and respond to changes in public reactions to the shaming of one 
million offenders a year. For example, the court would need to assess 
whether and when the public would begin to ignore this flood of infor-
mation. Public curiosity at first might be high, but likely would not 
endure. Moreover, in major metropolitan areas the shaming ads 
might occupy enough space to warrant addition of a pull-out section 
of the newspaper, which might easily be tossed aside, unread, along 
with other newspaper inserts. To avoid this, courts might adopt differ-
ent types of shaming. For example, a judge may instead impose home-
centered shamings, such as lawn signs or bumper stickers. These more 
localized shamings, however, would entail more localized, "custom-
ized" shaming impact assessments. 
Evaluations of public responses to various types of shaming might 
resemble the public opinion surveys, market research, or other assess-
ments of popular opinion that businesses or politicians commonly 
must make to sell or promote their products or themselves. Sophisti-
cated work in this area likely costs more, and involves more special-
ized expertise, than reformers may imagine. Yet if states fail to 
249. Id. at 11. 
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undertake this kind of analysis, then shaming sanctions are unlikely to 
maintain the deterrence impact that is their primary justification. 250 
Even if shamings were well-publicized and did continue to com-
mand significant public attention, however, they might affect the pub-
lic's reaction to crimes and criminals in ways that the shame sanction 
advocates may not have anticipated, and may not desire. As I have 
indicated, most punishment now tends to take place out of public 
view.251 This is especially true in densely populated urban settings, 
where anonymity and disinterest in others' lives often are governing 
rules of public interpersonal relations. Accordingly, the community 
can distance itself psychologically from the process and results of pun-
ishment. 252 This distancing is reinforced by the fact that the few 
criminals who are personalized and who do come to popular attention 
are the particularly grotesque, bizarre, or flamboyant offenders.253 
Public shaming, by definition, would mean wider public exposure 
to punishment, and hence to a greater number of less sensational de-
fendants. Assuming that the criminal sanctions were imposed evenly, 
then at least for offenses that touch a cross-section of the population 
- such as drunk driving, shoplifting, spouse and child abuse, or tax 
fraud - the public would directly confront the impact of legal sanc-
tions on the lives of people with whom more people can empathize. 
Several practical effects, some adverse, might flow from this 
"deprivatization" of criminal law. It would of course bring the gravity 
of these offenses home to more people. This, in fact, is what the sane-
250. Other practical and fairness problems also may emerge. For example, if courts resorted 
to home-centered shamings, such as lawn signs, neighboring property owners likely would object. 
They first might attempt to drive the offender from the neighborhood. If she refused to move, 
however, the property owners likely would resent the judge who imposed the sentence and could 
complain about, if not sue over, the stigma spillover onto these innocent neighbors. Cabining the 
effects of these customized shame sanctions thus could be quite complicated. Assuring that all 
shame sanctions had some effect, and continued to do so, however, would be more complicated. 
At present, courts have no mechanisms for conducting such inquiries. These mechanisms, 
though, would need to be explored before widespread use of shaming could proceed. 
251. See supra note 210. 
252. For a discussion of the psychological works that describe the role of identification with 
another person and empathy for her, see Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1574 (1987). 
253. Occasionally, a sympathetic figure will capture public attention. A devoted elderly hus-
band will end a spouse's misery, or a wrongly accused person will be vindicated and released. 
More often, however, the offenders who receive concentrated mainstream or tabloid attention are 
people like Richard Ramirez, who murdered 13 people in southern California and who, we are 
told, on one occasion "gouged out the eyes of the victim." See Court in Los Angeles Gives 'Night 
Stalker' Death in 13 Killings, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at Al8, col. 5. The news account 
reported that shortly before he was sentenced to die in the gas chamber he made a statement that 
included remarks like "Lucifer dwells within us all," and "I am beyond evil." Id. Such selective 
accounts of criminal court business enable the public to see criminals as alien "others" and to 
favor quite strict crime control measures. 
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tioners hope will occur. The stronger our identification with the of-
fender the greater our sense that we could end up in her same 
predicament. This certainly might deter others from committing simi-
lar crimes, which likely is the principal aim of the shame sentence. On 
the other hand, however, public discomfort and strong identification 
with offenders254 might also result in public resistance to the sanction, 
and thus a softening of the criminal laws, or even a call for reprivatiza-
tion,255 as is evidenced by the demise of public spectacles in seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. These consequences, of 
course, may not seem undesirable to all observers. My point here is 
that I doubt that reformers have taken them into account. 
Public reactions to public shaming sanctions thus likely would be 
variable and complex. They would hinge on the nature of the sanc-
tion, the identity of the offenders, the character of the crime, and the 
perceived identification of the target audience with the offender. Au-
dience acceptance of and cooperation in this "ritual" may be far more 
unpredictable and various than the judges and legislators who favor 
shaming sanctions suppose. Public sanctioning may even, in some 
cases, lead to an increase in violation of laws. The superficial appeal of 
this revival, upon closer inspection, thus begins to erode when one 
looks deeper at the nature of shanie, the cultural context in which 
shaming has been "revived," and the multiple practical, institutional, 
and situational problems that may emerge. 
F. Middle-Class Offenders: Windows of Shaming Opportunity? 
Despite the foregoing arguments against shaming, some readers 
likely remain persuaded that a good public spanking will "work" for 
some offenders. One population of lawbreakers in particular -
strongly socialized, middle-class offenders - may seem especially vul-
nerable to shaming because it tends to satisfy most of the cultural, 
psychological, and other conditions of shaming. Thus, some people 
would argue, shaming may make sense as a means of controlling bad 
behavior in this pocket of moral cohesion. 
The argument that middle-class offenders will respond to shame 
sanctions has some force. Middle-class members likely most fear loss 
of social status, both because they have such status to lose and because 
254. Increased identification with offenders contributed to the demise of public executions in 
Europe. Pieter Spierenburg states, in his study of public executions and other public punish-
ments in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Amsterdam, that "[b]y the end of the eight-
eenth century some of the audience could feel the pain of delinquents on the scaffold. . . . [I]nter-
human identification had increased." P. SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at 184. 
255. The public resistance to spectacle punishment in Europe led to the decline of public 
punishment, not of punishment in general; that is, it led to privatization. See id. 
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it is precariously balanced. The members of this group have not at-
tained, and most likely never will attain, the immunity from shunning 
and ostracism that exceptional wealth or high social standing affords. 
Acquisition of exceptional wealth, enough to elevate one to upper-
class status, seldom occurs in one lifetime. Movement of this sort usu-
ally involves high risk behavior, entrepreneurial genius, or exceptional 
good luck - all low frequency occurrences. High social standing is 
even harder to obtain. Typically, it is inherited and immutable. 
Although marriage can enhance one's social standing, the elevation is 
less authentic, less stable, and not always generally acknowledged. 
Thus, elevation to a demonstrably higher social class is simply not 
possible for the vast majority of middle-class or lower middle-class 
people. 
Demotion to a lower social class, in contrast, is always a distinct 
possibility. Middle-class status typically hinges on steady income and 
observation of middle-class rules of behavior. Loss of one's job, major 
illness, divorce, or notorious violation of middle-class norms, without 
more, can precipitate a slide into the lower class. Middle-class offend-
ers thus may seem to be "ideal" targets for shaming sanctions. They 
are the people most likely to worry about public appearances, to be 
vulnerable to moralistic or judgmental social groups, to defer to au-
thority, and to be relatively conventional in attitudes toward "law and 
order." Thus, for crimes that are likely to be committed by middle-
class people, the shaming sanctions may work best, if they work any-
where. These crimes would include, among others, drinking offenses, 
driving offenses, embezzlement, drug offenses, spouse abuse, child 
abuse, and tax fraud. 
Even here, though, the many practical limitations of the sort I al-
ready have named may surface and undermine the effectiveness of the 
shaming tactics. The middle class is subject to the same range of in-
traclass personality deviations, individualized meanings of shame, and 
unpredictable responses to shame sanctions as are other subcultures. 
Childrearing practices, to name one of many variables that influence 
the shame phenomenon, vary widely among members of the middle 
class. Also, even middle-class offenders likely are not as conventional 
or susceptible to shame as we imagine. For example, in State v. Rosen-
berger, 256 the defendant had held a respectable position with American 
Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). Rosenberger stole two AT&T 
checks, totaling $375,000, and deposited them into his personal check-
ing account. The defendant argued that his "shame and disgrace" in 
256. 207 N.J. Super. 350, 504 A.2d 160 (1985). 
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being convicted was sufficient punishment. Judge Imbriani rejected 
this argument for the following pertinent reasons: 
[The defendant] had minimal roots anywhere and lived in Bound Brook 
for only two years prior to this offense. After being fired by AT & T he 
moved to California and quickly obtained a new and equally lucrative 
position. There is no evidence that he is now shunned socially, finan-
cially or otherwise. He still earns as much as he did at AT & T and it is 
probable that his new neighbors are totally unaware of his criminal con-
duct. So where is the shame? With whom has he been disgraced? How 
has he been punished? It is apparent that he simply moved his employ-
ment and residence 3,000 miles and continued his same life style without 
so much as a hitch.251 
That is, even some members of the middle class, especially in large 
cities, may not care enough about what "society" thinks to make 
shaming a demonstrably more effective tool than mere conviction and 
customary punishments. Residential and occupational mobility, cou-
pled with a generally eroded sense of community, can undermine the 
effectiveness of stigma punishments, even for the social groups tradi-
tionally most sensitive to stigma. 
G. Conclusion 
The meaning of any punishment is partly contextual. The peniten-
tiary, to the Quakers, was a benign invention, meant to redeem the 
prisoner, not torture her.258 Given modem cultural conditions, the 
meaning of shame sanctions is not benign. Rather, the message of 
modem shaming is predominantly harsh and disintegrative, not reinte-
grative. It is likely to be construed by the viewers, and experienced by 
the offender, as purely retributive - not rehabilitative or redemptive. 
And if it does deter anyone, it likely will deter most effectively those 
people for whom conviction and conventional punishments are threat-
ening enough. 
Braithwaite probably is correct when he says that "[y]ou cannot 
take the moral content out of social control and expect social control 
to work. If there is no morality about the law, if it is just a game of 
rational economic tradeoffs, cheating will be rife."259 But his assump-
tion that a society that replaces conventional punishment with reinte-
grative shaming will have less crime260 seems unduly optimistic. It 
also ignores the extent to which a "punitive" practice in one context 
may be "reintegrative" in another and vice versa. The more promising 
257. 207 N.J. Super. at 356-58, 504 A.2d at 164. 
258. See T. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT 65 (1987). 
259. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 142. 
260. Id. at 80. 
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sequence for his brand of reform is for informal, nongovernment insti-
tutions first to reconstitute a consensus about moral behavior and next 
to establish mechanisms for effective negative and positive reinforce-
ment of behavior. Decentralization of authority, revitalization of fam-
ily bonds and communal bonds, and a more robust sense of 
interdependence and responsibility to others thus should precede, or at 
least accompany, any legislative or judicial attempt to shame people 
into norm observation. Absent these preliminary and formidable 
steps, a formal shaming sanction is unlikely to convey the moral con-
tent Braithwaite desires. Rather, it will represent a purely retributive 
slap by an unforgiving and impersonal authority, and a feeble form of 
criminal justice. 
VII. HUMANENESS FACTORS 
The combination of stigma and loss of liberty that inheres in criminal 
punishment represents a net loss in human dignity and autonomy. It is 
tempting to contemplate avoidance of that loss .... [O]ther things being 
equal, we should prefer punishments that do not entail stigma and loss of 
liberty to those that do.261 
A. Introduction 
In the preceding sections, I explored whether shaming is likely to 
promote valid punishment ends, in theory and in practice. In this final 
section, I consider whether the shaming sanctions are reasonably hu-
mane. The humaneness of a penalty depends on a host of factors, in-
cluding whether it is proportional to the crime, is administered in an 
even-handed manner across offenders, and is not exceptionally degrad-
ing or cruel. 262 
261. H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 255. 
262. I do not address the constitutional arguments against such sanctions, which of course 
are particularized fairness arguments, because other writers already have done so. See, e.g., 
Note, supra note 42, at 658-60; Note, The Modem Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of 
Modem Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1376-78, 1381-84; Note, ''Scarlet Letter" 
Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
613, 624-34 (1988); Note, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentenc-
ing - Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICKINSON L. REV. 759 (1989). 
One of the principal constitutional objections is based on the eighth amendment's proscrip-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. Constitutional arguments also might be based on the 
due process and equal protection clauses, on the first amendment, and on the right to privacy. 
Resolution of these constitutional points should depend, to a large degree, on how courts resolve 
the proportionality, equality, and dignity concerns raised in the following sections. As the Court 
in Hutto v. Finney explained: "The Eighth Amendment's ban on inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishments ..• 'proscribe[s] more than physically barbarous punishments' . . • • It prohibits 
penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense, ..• as well as those that transgress 
today's 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.' " 
437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
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All existing forms of punishment violate these principles to some 
degree, insofar as state-imposed punishment is an inexact, unevenly 
experienced, and often highly coercive response to norm violations. 
Nevertheless, the elusiveness of shame, the unreflective way in which 
the new shaming sanctions have been developed, and the serious harm 
to human dignity that truly effective shaming can cause, all suggest 
that the fairness objections to official shunning and shame are particu-
larly compelling. 
B. Proportionality 
Proportionality of a penalty can be assessed in at least two ways: 
the punishment can be matched to the crime, ignoring offender-spe-
cific variations, or the punishment can be matched to the crime, taking 
into account offender-specific mitigating factors, such as remorse. 
For a punishment under either account to "match" the crime, 
though, it must be a measurable sanction. With shaming, the harm to 
the offender is almost wholly intangible and cannot be assessed. Psy-
chological studies of shame indicate that the same stimulus may pro-
duce deep shame in some offenders and no shame in others. Thus, to 
the extent that punishment is justified both as a negative and a propor-
tional reaction to crime, shaming may offend both qualities: it may 
not, for some offenders, be "negative" at all, and the same stimulus 
may not be experienced equally by equally culpable actors. 
This latter objection, of course, is hardly unique to shaming penal-
ties; the impact of money fines, incarceration or any other penalty is 
felt unevenly as well. Likewise, shame is a potential, often likely, con-
sequence of all forms of public punishment. The question, however, is 
not whether peripheral and disproportional stigmatizing already is 
part of the criminal process, but whether it is a desirable part that 
should be augmented and exploited. That other penalties may pro-
duce similar untoward consequences does not make these objections 
pointless when applied to shaming. Also, most conventional punish-
ments involve at least some measurable, transsituational factors, such 
as the hours of community service, the months spent in prison, or the 
dollars assessed as a fine. Judges thus can be reasonably confident 
both about whether a penalty has been imposed, and whether the dos-
age of the penalty is increasing, regardless of the offender's personality 
or social circumstances. Money and time, at least, are susceptible to 
numerical estimations; embarrassment, ego strength, and social stand-
ing defy quantitative assessment. 
Another proportionality concern is that the stigma of shaming 
may be irreversible. This possibility presumably would have to be 
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taken into account in the court's or legislature's proportionality assess-
ment. Fear of the peripheral and long-lasting effects of stigma associ-
ated with all punishments has convinced some penologists that 
officials should try to contain, not enhance, the publicity and labeling 
aspect of a criminal sanction.263 With new shaming sanctions, how-
ever, judicial efforts to confine the shame to a discrete time period are 
unlikely to work. On the contrary, such efforts seem inconsistent with 
the effort to publicize the punishment. Once an offense becomes noto-
rious, the public will do as it chooses with the information, regardless 
of official admonitions. This would be especially true in work and so-
cial relationships, where shunning might be acute for some offenders. 
Officials also must consider the potential unfairness of stigma spil-
lover. Whenever a person is sanctioned, the negative impact may ex-
tend to her family or other associates. This spillover effect is 
augmented when the offense is widely publicized or sensationalized. 
For example, one study of prisoners' wives' feelings of shame indicates 
that the wives were particularly embarrassed when their spouse's be-
havior and conviction were publicized in the local news media.264 Ex-
panded use of public shaming surely would deliver more convincing 
blows to these innocent others' reputations than conventional punish-
ment methods already tend to. Although this could enhance the de-
terrence impact of a shaming sentence, at least to the extent that 
would-be offenders care about bringing disgrace to their intimate asso-
ciates and kin, this does not necessarily entitle lawmakers or judges to 
exploit this apprehension. 
One likely response to all of these proportionality objections is that 
they rely on individual-specific factors. Proportionality might instead 
be defined as matching the sanction to the offense, not to the of-
fender. 265 The "eye for an eye" might be estimated not on the basis of 
263. See N. w ALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OP CRIMI· 
NAL JUSTICE 147 (1980) (noting that many countries today have laws designed to limit the 
stigma of a conviction, by allowing for official expurgation of the record). 
264. Fishman, Stigmatization and Prisoners' Wives' Feelings of Shame, 9 DEVIANT BEHAV. 
169, 174 (1988). 
265. The recently adopted Federal Sentencing Guidelines take this approach in part, by 
deeming offender-specific characteristics such as education and vocational skills, family ties and 
responsibilities, and community ties as "not ordinarily relevant" in sentencing. U.S. SENTENC· 
ING CoMMN., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5Hl.2, 5Hl.6, at 240-41 
(1988). The guidelines do regard as relevant the defendant's "acceptance of responsibility" for 
her criminal conduct. Id. at§ 3El.1, at 197. They list as evidence of this acceptance specific 
conduct, not mere verbal expressions of regret or responsibility. Id. More to the point of this 
Article, a federal commission that in the 1970s debated reforms offederal criminal law expressly 
considered and rejected the "publicity" sanctions "as inappropriate with respect either to organi-
zations or to individuals, despite its possible deterrent effect, since it came too close to the adop-
tion of a policy approving social ridicule as a sanction." NATL. COMMN. ON REFORM OP FED. 
CRIM. LAWS, FINAL REPORT,§ 3007, Comment (1971). 
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actual shame experienced by the offender and her family, but on how 
much shame an average member of the community might or should 
feel if she were ordered to wear the same sign. Thus, proportionality 
inquiries would become less complex, at least insofar as the limitless 
range of individual shades of shame would not need to be consulted or 
reckoned. 
The problem with this alternative is that these shaming schedules 
still would need to identify and grade an intensely slippery variable. 
The "cultural meaning of shame" within the United States is exceed-
ingly amorphous, if indeed one national meaning exists. Neither legis-
lators nor judges are likely to be able to define this variable accurately, 
let alone determ.it}e the precise spectacle that will match both the cul-
ture's definitions of shame and the gravity of the offense. 266 For exam-
ple, on what possible basis might a sentencing reform commission 
decide that holding a sign in public was a proportional punishment for 
child molestation? Or, if a trial judge were to devise this sentence, 
how might the appellate court handle the defendant's argument that 
this sanction was not proportional to the crime? A coherent, articul-
able argument that a sign sanction is, or is not, "proportional" to this 
offense is difficult to imagine. 
Equally difficult to express would be reasons for distinguishing 
more severe shaming sanctions from less harsh ones. Certainly, hold-
ing a sign in public for one week seems worse than a one-day sentence, 
but this is for reasons distinct from the shaming aspect of the sanction; 
for example, the deprivation of liberty would be greater. If everyone 
in town, or at least everyone significant to the offender, saw her during 
the first hour, then the subsequent hours would be irrelevant to the 
sanction's stigmatic impact, though liberty interests would become a 
stronger factor. Even if only one person saw the offender during the 
first hour, the stigma effect may be spread by that witness' relating the 
incident to others. In any event, the full measure of the stigma proba-
bly would be met at a certain threshold, after which "more shaming," 
"longer shaming," or wider publication would not matter much to the 
offender's reputation or sense of shame. Widespread, effective publica-
tion of the shaming probably would cause that shame threshold to be 
266. Again, however, I am not arguing that we have no shared consensus of "right or 
wrong," but that "shame" is a particularly elusive phenomenon. For example, the "cultural 
meaning" of other wrong conduct - such as race discrimination - may be susceptible to judi-
cial interpretation in ways that the cultural meaning of shame is not. Cf Lawrence, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 355-62 
(1987) (arguing that racially discriminatory acts have a cultural meaning that courts are capable 
of construing). 
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reached more quickly than ineffective publication, but it may not influ-
ence the final impact of disclosure. 
Thus, for those observers who regard proportionality as a crucial 
and tight limitation on punishment, the stigma consequences of any 
punishment are undesirable because they are beyond our ability to 
control, measure, or justify rationally. Either we must take the vary-
ing contextual aspects of stigma into account, which demands a degree 
of sophistication that we currently lack, or we must try to minimize or 
contain it despite any potential sacrifice of deterrent efficacy.267 
C. Equality 
Erving Goffman once wrote that "the more power and prestige the 
others have, the more a person is likely to show considerations for 
their feelings."268 To the extent that shame sanctions are "custom 
designed" to the offender, and not part of any sentencing guidelines, 
they thus are subject to the abuse of unequal application. If judges 
have discretion to fashion creative sentences, they may be inclined to 
deliver harsher sentences to some defendants than to others.269 
The modem revivals of shaming are not part of comprehensive 
shame schedules, but seem instead to be episodic, almost whimsical 
bursts of judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial inspiration. One signifi-
cant danger in such an ad hoc approach is that the "test group" for 
shaming will be the offenders with the least political or other means of 
objecting or retaliating. More powerful offenders may receive alterna-
tive sanctions like "community service," or fines. 
The risk of unequal application of shame sanctions might be con-
trolled by requiring that legislatures adopt mandatory sentencing 
guidelines, applied evenly to all offenders. But, as the current debates 
about mandatory sentencing in the federal system show, this form of 
equality can compromise equality in other senses.27° For example, the 
267. See N. WALKER, supra note 263, at 161. Walker suggests a third alternative, but it 
would not apply to shame punishments. This alternative would be for the punisher to simply 
ignore the unofficial stigma effect of the punishment, and demand only that the official punish-
ment be proportional. Id. With shame punishments, of course, the official punishment is the 
stigma. 
268. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 10 n.3. 
269. See E. POWERS, supra note 161, at 195-96 (noting that it was the poorer thieves, drunk· 
ards, and liars who were suitable candidates for the stocks; respected citizens were more likely to 
be fined). 
270. The deeper equality issues at stake with shaming sanctions, like those at stake with 
sanctions generally, are virtually insoluble. In another context, Jencks has explored the elusive 
meaning of "equal treatment" in terms that demonstrate several potential "inequalities" in deliv-
ering equal punishments to all offenders. He demonstrates, through a concrete example, the 
extent to which the meaning of equality depends on one's theory of justice. For example, a 
utilitarian will demand a different sort of equality than someone who embraces a moralistic the-
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legislature could insist that every person who steals $200 worth of 
goods be compelled to stand for one hour in the town square with a 
sign that reads "I am a thief." This would satisfy one rather static 
definition of equality. The only factor relevant to the punishment de-
cision would be whether the same offense had been committed. But if 
one offender stole $200 worth of groceries for her family, and the other 
stole a $200 stereo, then a different sense of equality would be of-
fended. Similarly, if one offender, who had never before stolen any-
thing in her life and enjoyed widespread public respect, were facing 
her first criminal charge, whereas the other had a string of prior prop-
erty offenses and had a reputation as a thief, then the hour in the 
square for the first would not be the same as the hour in the square for 
the second. One could, of course, simply define equality as "same of-
fense - same sign." But to do so would compromise other important 
meanings of equality. 
This problem, of course, is pervasive. Individualized approaches 
to criminal law enforcement will always both promote and defeat 
equality objectives, no matter what sanction we impose. No plausible 
sentencing schedule can anticipate the entire range of the individual 
factors that may determine the impact of a sanction. This aspect of 
the equality dilemma may be especially profound with shaming sanc-
tions, however, because "shame" is elusive and intensely offender-spe-
cific. Also, if judges did take the individualized meaning of a shame 
sanction into account, this could lead to the "unfair" result that prom-
inent, white collar or upper-class offenders, who have more social sta-
tus to lose, would receive milder sentences than less prominent lower-
class offenders. 271 Yet if this individualized meaning is ignored, this 
could lead to unduly punitive sentences for some offenders, beyond 
any plausible specific or even general deterrence needs. 
At present, the modem shame sanctions violate both senses of 
equality. They are neither part of a general, equally administered sen-
tencing scheme, nor the product of reflective, individualized estima-
tions of the offender's sense of shame. We do not know, for example, 
why the Rhode Island judge ordered Stephen Germershausen, but not 
other sex offenders, to place an ad in the newspaper for his offense. 
ory of justice. As applied to punishment generally, and to shaming in particular, Jencks' discus-
sion shows that the "equality" of punishment depends on whether we focus principally on the 
offender or on society as a whole. Jencks, Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Oppor-
tunity to be Equal?, 98 ETHICS 518 (1988). 
271. See State v. Rosenberger, 207 N.J. Super. 350, 358, 504 A.2d 160, 165 (1985) (noting 
that white-collar criminals stand a significantly lower chance of serving a long sentence if con-
victed than do bank robbers); Bramwell, Alternative Sentencing or Part-Time Imprisonment Is 
Discriminatory, 26 How. L.J. 1265, 1268 (1983) (arguing that "[a]ltematlve sentencing creates a 
two-tier system of justice and is indicative of basic unfairness and favoritism"). 
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Nothing in the reported account of his sentence suggests that the judge 
selected Germershausen for this sentence because he was unusually 
likely to respond to this type of sentence, or because he deserved it 
more than other offenders. Rather, the judge simply wanted to set an 
example; equality concerns were not part of her stated sentencing 
calculus. This is a serious omission, however, and raises the strong 
concern that the revival of shaming may violate the principle of even-
handed punishments. 
D. Cruelty 
The final fairness concern is the most difficult to define, though it 
makes immediate intuitive sense and may best capture the potential 
offense of an effective shaming sanction. When a shame sanction hits 
home, it is a direct assault on a basic need of all people,272 the esteem 
of others. The troublesome inquiry is whether we should approve of 
government punishment that is principally designed to withdraw this 
esteem. In other words, is this type of dehumanizing punishment too 
"cruel" to be an acceptable sanction? 
A common response to this concern is that the criminal has bar-
gained away, or sacrificed involuntarily, her social standing in ex-
change for the projected fruits of her criminal activity. Social stability 
demands that public officials impose the burden of shame and guilt on 
those who defy basic, shared rules of civility and order. Some people 
thus argue that if some individuals' self-esteem is lost through the 
criminal process, then their loss is justified by our collective interest in 
our mutual protection, freedom, and well-being. Some may even ar-
gue that the offender's dignity is affirmed by holding her accountable 
for her actions, because this implies a belief that she is a rational, au-
tonomous person. 
As far as it goes, and as general as it is, the argument makes con-
siderable sense. The argument depends, of course, on one's views 
about the etiology of crime, the effectiveness of degradation in curbing 
future behavior, and the danger of state-imposed punishments aimed 
directly at wounding offender's self-esteem and social standing. But 
even if we accept that government-imposed self- esteem losses are justi-
fiable under some punishment circumstances, we still must determine 
whether a particular method of withdrawing that esteem produces ad-
equate public good to justify these individual harms. 
This resolution turns several factors. First, it hinges on the nature 
of the wound that punishment inflicts. Psychological studies of shame 
272. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440 (1971). 
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are important to this inquiry because they disclose how serious the 
harm of effective shaming may be. The likely practical consequences 
of shaming also are important because they determine whether the 
competing societal interest warrants this potential assault on human 
dignity. Taken together, the likely practical advantages of shaming 
seem to be far less than its proponents imagine. Indeed, they may be 
negligible. This suggests that the balance of community versus indi-
vidual offender concerns may tip decidedly in favor of the offender in 
the case of shame sanctions. 
One could reach this same conclusion simply by arguing that it is 
always immoral to intentionally degrade a human being. This argu-
ment, though, would render any punishment scheme "immoral," a re-
sult I regard as senseless, in both practical and moral terms. When we 
wound others - by robbing, assaulting, driving recklessly, cheating, 
or otherwise - we can expect and in some sense deserve rebuke. This 
rebuke may well lower our social standing, and hence compromise our 
self-image. If we deny states the power to injure one's social standing, 
we deny them the power to convict and punish criminals. I would 
oppose such a result, as would most people. Nonetheless, whenever 
we place the power to rebuke in the hands of the government, liber-
alism reminds us to be extremely wary of that authority, and to de-
mand that the power be exercised minimally, uniformly, and subject to 
constant reexamination and supervision. 
State-enforced shaming authorizes public officials to search for and 
destroy or damage an offender's dignity. Aggressive use of such au-
thority may be an Orwellian prospect, particularly when reintegration 
is not part of the punishment process. Absent far more compelling 
evidence than we currently possess that shaming would produce de-
monstrably better results than conventional punishments, then, sham-
ing should not become part of the sentencer's arsenal. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Jurists and legislators have good reason to be frustrated by the fail-
ures of past attempts to find effective, humane, and economic punish-
ment techniques. But shaming sanctions are not the solution. We 
cannot wish away the absence of cultural conditions that might make 
shaming a meaningful cultural ritual. We likewise cannot ignore the 
profound harm that effective shaming, where it can be achieved, may 
cause. 
The historical demise of public shaming in dominant Western cul-
ture was prompted by rationalistic and humanistic instincts. The ex-
periences that gave rise to those instincts should inform modem 
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attempts to fashion rational, humane criminal punishment. They cau-
tion against widespread revival of the pillory and stocks in the United 
States. Absent thoroughgoing changes in the nature of the modem 
state, in criminal court procedures and personnel, and in the dominant 
culture's conception of the relationship between the individual and her 
community, the modem shaming sanctions will not work. At best, 
they are likely to prove futile, even silly, responses to crime. At worst, 
they may become highly destructive, state-imposed assaults on human 
personality. 
